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ABSTRACT
CONFLICTING VOICES AND STRATEGIC CHOICES:
CAPITAL STRUCTURE HETEROGENEITY AND STRATEGIC
ACTIONS
SEPTEMBER 2015
CHETAN CHAWLA, B.A., DELHI UNIVERSITY
M.B.A., UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Anurag Sharma
The mix of debt and equity in a firm’s capital structure has been associated with
varied strategic actions, such as diversification and innovation. Different forms of
debt and equity have been associated with particular types of strategic actions.
Although there are clear differences between debt and equity, I argue there are
also similarities across the two forms of capital. I develop a theoretical framework
to categorize both debt and equity along the dimensions of time horizon and risk
tolerance, so as to categorize the providers of capital as Transient Equity,
Dedicated Equity, Transactional Debt, and Relational Debt. I then empirically
investigate the association between the presence of these four forms in the capital
structure of firms and their strategic actions.

My theory development is anchored in transaction cost economics, which
conceptualizes debt and equity as not merely financing choices but also
governance structures (Williamson, 1988). Debt (rules) resembles markets while
equity (discretion) has features of hierarchies. My integrated categorization of
vi

heterogeneous debt holders and equity holders along the dimensions of time
horizon and risk tolerance augments this transaction cost reasoning to within debt
and equity. I test my hypotheses on multiple panels of publicly held U.S. firms
between 1996 and 2010 in the contexts of diversification, research & development
(R & D), and mergers & acquisitions (M & A). After controlling for endogeneity
– using Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) regressions for dynamic panels
with robust inference – I find strong support for the hypothesized relationships in
the case of mergers and acquisitions; and partial support for association between
forms of capital and diversification, and research and development. In essence,
my theory development and empirical analysis suggests a more nuanced role in
strategy formation of capital providers than envisioned in extant theory.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
“ Equity is soft, debt hard. Equity is forgiving, debt insistent. Equity is a
pillow, debt a sword. Equity and debt are the Yin and Yang of corporate
finance…Equity lulls management to sleep, forgiving their sins more
readily than a death-bed priest...Debt’s edge jabs management awake,
demanding attention.”
Stewart & Glassman (1988: 81)

The colorful characterization above (Stewart & Glassman, 1988)
underlines the persistent view of debt and equity as being bestowed with distinct
attributes, and consequently distinctively associated with firm level strategic
actions. A call to investigate these associations between capital structure and firm
strategy was made thirty years ago (Bettis, 1983) along with an insistence to avoid
simplifying assumptions in such investigations (Barton & Gordon, 1987).
Management scholars have heeded such calls by investigating strategic
implications of equity (Connelly, Tihanyi, Certo, & Hitt, 2010b; Hoskisson, Hitt,
Johnson, & Grossman, 2002; Johnson & Greening, 1999; Tihanyi, Johnson,
Hoskisson, & Hitt, 2003) and debt heterogeneity (David, O'Brien, & Yoshikawa,
2008). Unfortunately, this research has bifurcated into two independent streams,
one investigating debt and the other equity heterogeneity, each assuming the other
homogeneous. In this dissertation, I combine these distinct literatures to
investigate the joint implications of debt and equity heterogeneity on strategic
actions.
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Williamson (1988) argued that debt and equity have governance attributes
of markets (rules) and hierarchies (discretion) respectively. However,
conceptualizing and examining debt and equity separately weakens the ability to
understand the governance aspects of capital structure (Williamson, 1988) by
suppressing attributes that the two forms of capital hold in common. This is
especially relevant now as strategy scholars have moved beyond homogenous
conceptions of debt and equity to recognition of heterogeneity within debt (David
et al., 2008; O'Brien, David, Yoshikawa, & Delios, 2014) and equity (Hoskisson
et al., 2002). That is, not all equity is the same nor is all debt the same;
considerable within-group differences remain as different types of equity holders
bring different motivations to their role as residual owners and, similarly,
different debt holders differ from each other as well. Researchers have noted that
neither all equity holders (Hoskisson et al., 2002) nor all debt holders (David et
al., 2008) speak with the same voice. In fact, some equity holders may be aligned
less with other equity holders and more with certain debt holders, and vice versa.
The usual distinctions between debt and equity may, in other words, undermine
the ability to credibly understand the relationship between capital structure and
strategic choices made by firms (cf. Hoskisson et al., 2002).

Given the tendency to conceptualize debt and equity as fundamentally
different from each other, the many conflicting voices in the capital structure are
heard in isolation—thereby fragmenting research by shackling debt and equity
heterogeneity into separate silos. Extant literature has investigated the association
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between different groups of equity holders or different groups of debt holders,
separately, with firm strategic actions such as diversification (Kochhar & Hitt,
1998; Ngah-Kiing Lim, Das, & Das, 2009; Tihanyi et al., 2003) and innovation
(David, Hitt, & Gimeno, 2001; David et al., 2008). This separation is perhaps
driven by a persistent view amongst management scholars of equity and debt as
merely financing choices. Viewed from this constricted lens, debt and equity are
simply modes of raising capital and thus their associations with firm outcomes are
investigated in isolation.

Viewed from a wider lens, the combination of debt and equity
heterogeneity is critical since their division has had far reaching repercussions on
our understanding of capital structure’s influence on strategic actions. First, this
division has led to the assumption of homogeneity of either debt or equity holders
(David et al., 2008). This has prevented theoretical development to understand the
underlying dimensions and interactions of these diverse groups of debt and equity
holders embedded in capital structure.

Second, if the choice of debt and equity has governance implications – as
suggested by transaction cost reasoning – then these differing implications must
extend within debt and equity also. The current literature assumes these
governance implications are limited to between debt and equity. Consequently,
lack of theoretical integration connecting these diverse capital structure groups
has diluted the original vision of a “combined treatment of corporate finance and
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corporate governance” (Williamson, 1988: 567). The impact of this assumption
on the transaction cost perspective has been a predominant focus on transaction
(e.g. uncertainty) and resource (e.g. asset specificity) attributes at the expense of
governance structures (Williamson, 1991).

Third, the selective picking of some elements of capital structure over
others weakens the link between management theory and practice (Foss &
Hallberg, 2013). This may explain the lack of support for ownership-performance
studies (Dalton, Daily, Certo, & Roengpitya, 2003), all of which assume debt
homogeneity. The assumption of debt homogeneity in research is surprising since
studies indicate that in practice a high proportion of large U.S. public firms, the
most common sample used in management research (Short, Ketchen, & Palmer,
2002), combine different forms of debt (Colla, Ippolito, & Li, 2013; Rauh & Sufi,
2010). In fact, in their sample of large public firms, Rauh and Sufi found that 53%
of firm-year observations employ bank debt while 55% employ bonds, in other
words: “A substantial fraction utilize both” (2010: 4251). Thus, there are perhaps
substitutive or complementary governance implications of debt heterogeneity that
have been disregarded in management literature. The governance implications of
a holistic range of capital structure may thus inform corporate governance
research.

Extant research on capital structure suggests that varied equity holders
differ in their support for strategic actions based on differences in their time
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horizons. For example, the long-term orientation of pension fund managers
predisposes them to favor internal innovation in the form of R & D investments
by firms (Hoskisson et al., 2002). This is because the long-term payoffs of such
internal innovation (David et al., 2001) are aligned with the investment time
horizons of pension funds. Parallel research suggests that support for innovation
varies amongst debt holders due to different risk tolerances. Relational debt
holders (i.e. banks) have been found to support R & D investments by firms since
close and repeated interactions between these relational debt holders and firms
reduces information asymmetries and increases the risk tolerance and adaptability
of lenders (David et al., 2008).

In this dissertation, therefore, I offer a new conceptualization whereby
debt and equity are reframed along two important dimensions of time horizon and
risk tolerance of capital—and thereby reassess the influence that different types of
capital (combinations of equity and debt) have on the strategic choices of firms.
Specifically, research suggests that long-term dedicated equity holders represent
patient capital that is positively related to innovation, i.e., firm R & D spending.
Conversely, short-term transient equity holders represent impatient capital that
has a negative influence on innovation (Bushee, 1998; Hoskisson et al., 2002; Lee
& O'Neill, 2003). Parallel to such equity heterogeneity research, results in the
debt heterogeneity literature suggest that short-term transactional debt (i.e. bonds)
negatively impacts innovation. On the other hand, long-term relational debt
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positively impacts innovation (David et al., 2008). Thus, I argue that the
dimensions underlying both debt and equity are the same.

In summary, I offer two distinct contributions in this dissertation. One,
when viewed from a transaction cost lens (Williamson, 1988), both debt and
equity have governance implications that are adapted to particular types of
strategic actions. Generally, debt follows a more rigid, rule-based governance
regime (akin to markets) while equity follows a more discretionary governance
regime (akin to hierarchy). I extend this transaction cost conceptualization by
arguing that these governance attributes are driven by the dimensions of time
horizon and risk tolerance and extend to different forms of debt and equity.

The second contribution centers on the mediation mechanisms driving the
association between capital structure and strategic actions. Innovation and
diversification entail significant investments and involvement from top executives
of the firm (Chen, Smith, & Grimm, 1992). Also, different forms of opportunism
and exchange hazards hamper markets and hierarchies and therefore require
specific mitigation devices. Executive compensation, through incentives,
mitigates opportunism in the form of holdup that is prevalent in market
governance (i.e., impatient capital). While, the board of directors, through
monitoring, mitigates moral hazard prevalent in hierarchical governance (i.e.,
patient capital) by facilitating proprietary information exchange.

6

To develop this thesis, I begin with an integrated literature review of the
association between capital structure and strategic actions (chapter 2). In the
theory development section (chapter 3), I begin by establishing the governance
structures embedded in capital structure. Next, I develop a theoretical model that
explains the governance attributes of diverse debt and equity holders using the
dimensions of time horizons and risk tolerance. I further posit that the board of
directors and compensation mediates the relationship between capital structure
heterogeneity and strategic actions. The methods section (chapter 4) provides data
sources and an explanation of the analysis used – Generalized Methods of
Moments regressions – to control for endogeneity. The results (chapter 5) and
discussion (chapter 6) sections present my findings. In essence, my theorizing is
strongly supported in the context of Mergers and Acquisitions; while the mixed
results for Diversification and Research and Development suggest that capital
structure plays a more nuanced role than extant theories have conceived.
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CHAPTER 2
CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND STRATEGY – AN INTEGRATED REVIEW
AND ASSESSMENT

Introduction

Capital structure – the mix of debt and equity used to finance a firm – and,
its influence on firms is perhaps one of the oldest themes in corporate governance
(Berle & Means, 1932). Berle and Means focused on the dispersion of ownership
amongst equity holders and the resulting separation of ownership and control. In
more recent decades, capital structure scholarship has encompassed research
incorporating owners (i.e. equity holders) as well as creditors (i.e. debt holders).
The purpose of this literature review is to take an integrated view of capital
structure and its linkages to firm strategic actions such as diversification and
innovation. I incorporate 66 representative papers (see Tables 1 – 3) selected from
the top management journals. Considering the scope of this dissertation, I focus
my discussion on papers that investigate the association between capital structure
variables and the strategic actions of diversification and innovation.

In the eight decades since the foundational work by Berle and Means,
capital structure research can be classified into three distinct waves of
investigations: The first wave was triggered in finance by a set of papers
(Modigliani & Miller, 1958, 1963) that argued for the irrelevance of capital
structure for firm valuation. These analytical works were underpinned by
8

idealized assumptions, such as perfect markets, that subsequent research has
relaxed (Myers, 2001) in order to empirically test the linkages between capital
structure and firm strategic actions, performance and valuation. The bulk of this
research in management (n = 17 in this review) has conceptualized capital
structure as leverage, i.e., as made up of homogeneous debt holders and equity
holders.

Subsequent research has evolved from considering capital structure to be
simply firm leverage to recognition of heterogeneity within capital structure.
These constitute the second wave of research papers (n = 40 in this review) that
have gone beyond simple leverage ratios to investigate associations between
heterogeneous groups of equity holders and firm strategic actions such as
diversification, innovation and corporate social performance. This literature
equates ownership, i.e., equity holders, with governance (Connelly, Hoskisson,
Tihanyi, & Certo, 2010a; Daily, Dalton, & Rajagopalan, 2003b) in all its myriad
forms and contexts. A flourishing subset of this literature investigates family
ownership. Although vast, family businesses have recently been reviewed
(Gedajlovic, Carney, Chrisman, & Kellermanns, 2012; Schulze & Gedajlovic,
2010) and are beyond the scope of this dissertation – they are therefore excluded
from this broader review of the capital structure literature.

This second wave of capital structure research has kept pace with changes
in the governance landscape (Daily et al., 2003b), which has evolved since the
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Berle and Means era. Instead of dispersion of ownership and its separation from
control, firm management faces diverse blockholders and institutional investors
(Johnson, Schnatterly, Johnson, & Chiu, 2010) who may even act as monitoring
substitutes of the board of directors (Desender, Aguilera, Crespi, & Garc ́IaCestona, 2013). These changes, i.e. shift from dispersed to concentrated
ownership, have intensified in recent years. For example, pension funds have
become the predominant form of long-term equity capital available for firms
(Buttonwood, 2012).

Finally, the third wave of capital structure research investigates the
association between heterogeneous groups of debt holders and firm strategic
actions. This is a promising research area whose sparseness (n = 9) reflects a
pervasive debt homogeneity assumption (David et al., 2008). Nonetheless,
research suggests that different kinds of debt holders are differentially associated
with firm financing (Mizruchi & Stearns, 1994a), knowledge capabilities (Uzzi &
Gillespie, 2002), innovation (David et al., 2008) and diversification (O'Brien et
al., 2014). Research also indicates that the majority of large public U.S. firms
carry multiple forms of debt (Rauh & Sufi, 2010) and that debt specialization, i.e.
debt homogeneity, is a feature of relatively smaller firms that are unrated in credit
markets (Colla et al., 2013).

This continuing evolution of capital structure and its association with firm
strategy calls for an updated review that incorporates all three waves of research:
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homogeneous debt/equity, equity heterogeneity and debt heterogeneity. Extant
reviews have focused primarily on the ownership as governance literature, i.e.,
equity heterogeneity (Connelly et al., 2010a; Daily et al., 2003b). These important
and impactful reviews underscore the significance of the broader capital structure
research – spanning both between and within debt holder and equity holder
groups – which this review aims to highlight. Unfortunately, no recent review of
this literature exits, with this review I seek to integrate these seemingly disparate
literatures that investigate the association between capital structure heterogeneity
and strategy.

Another contribution of this review is to the broader corporate governance
literature. Meta-analysis of the equity holder and firm performance relationship
(Dalton et al., 2003) has yielded insignificant or equivocal results suggesting the
presence of indirect effects. In other words, conflicting findings maybe driven by
exclusion of strategic actions, which have for long been known to mediate the
association between ownership and performance variables (Hill & Snell, 1988:
585). Thus, the unsettled nature of the capital structure (across both debt and
equity) and performance relationship may better explicated by incorporating
strategic actions, i.e. intervening variables such as diversification and innovation,
whose exclusion may be leading to equivocality in the ownership and governance
literature.

11

This review spans 66 published papers that are representative of capital
structure research in management. Of these 66 papers, 3 are theoretical and 63 are
empirical studies, mainly from the top management journals: Academy of
Management Journal, Academy of Management Review, Administrative Science
Quarterly, Journal of Management and the Journal of Management Science. The
earliest paper is a call for capital structure research (Bettis, 1983) in the Academy
of Management Review published thirty years ago. Subsequent research was
identified using keyword searches for capital structure, institutional investors,
debt holders, relational debt and transactional debt. In addition, forward cites of
the seminal papers were scanned to identify prospective papers for inclusion.
Only papers incorporating qualitative investigations or hypotheses testing of
capital structure variables and their relations to firm strategic actions were
incorporated. The review that follows reflects the three waves of capital structure
research discussed above – leverage (i.e. homogeneous debt and equity), equity
heterogeneity and finally, debt heterogeneity. I conclude with a summary of
future directions for capital structure research.
Leverage
The first wave of capital structure research – that assumed homogenous debt and
equity represented capital structure, measured by leverage – in finance was
triggered by a set of papers (Modigliani & Miller, 1958, 1963) that argued for the
separation of firm financing and firm investment strategy. The simplifying
assumptions for these claims were perfect markets and firms categorized as
homogenous classes of stock with similar income streams. Subsequent research
12

on firm capital structure has relaxed such unrealistic assumptions (Harris &
Raviv, 1991). We now know that agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and
transaction costs (Williamson, 1988) defy any attempts at separating firm
financing from firm strategy.

Capital structure research came onto the radar screen of organizational
scholars in the early 1980’s when Bettis called for greater integration between
modern financial theory and strategic management (Bettis, 1983). The rise of
modern financial theory centered on two developments: efficient market
hypothesis and the capital asset pricing model. These developments suggest that
the risk of a security could be divided into unsystematic and systematic risk. The
former, i.e. unsystematic risk was the unique risk associated with a security that
could be dealt with through portfolio diversification. The latter, i.e. systematic
risk was a market-level risk that could not be diversified away.

The call for synthesis between modern financial theory and strategic
management (Bettis, 1983) centered on three conundrums created by the rise of
modern financial theory: First, modern financial theory suggests that markets do
not reward the mitigation of firm specific (i.e., unsystematic) risk, the raison
d'être of strategy. Second, firms need to make information disclosures in order to
enable investors to make forecasts with greater accuracy and thereby increase the
value of the firm. However, these disclosures may decrease information
asymmetries between the firm and its competitors thereby raising appropriability
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hazards and imitation risks. Third, the modern financial theory paradigm is
centered on efficient capital markets, the capital asset pricing model and equity
holder wealth maximization. However, when facing international competition,
U.S. firms may be at a disadvantage against nations that are not part of this
paradigm. An example of such exceptions would be the low cost of capital
enjoyed by many foreign competitors, especially state owned enterprises (1983:
411).

Bettis’ call did not go unchallenged, Peavy argued that modern financial
theory is more aligned with strategy than previously believed (Peavy, 1984). For
example, regarding the first conundrum raised by Bettis, Peavy argued:

“In a diversified portfolio context beta is the only relevant risk measure
because it gauges only the nondiversifiable systematic risk. However, an
individual stock’s beta is affected by the total risk of the stock’s
return…beta is affected by the fundamental business and financial features
of the company…”
Peavy (1984: 153)

Therefore, modern financial theory does not expect managers to be
negligent of unsystematic (i.e., firm specific) risks. For example, firm specific
risks in the form of threat of entry can be diversified away by management, thus
allying the prescriptions of both modern financial theory and corporate strategy.
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In a similar manner, Peavy argued (1984: 155) that the second conundrum
overstates the information asymmetries created by competitive secrecy. Investors
simply want greater predictability of a firm’s future cash flows; this can be
accomplished without jeopardizing these cash flows by reaching a middle ground
of optimal information disclosure.

This early Bettis – Peavy debate in The Academy of Management Review
inspired the incorporation of capital structure research in strategic management.
In a few years the three conundrums had transformed into acknowledgement of
the critical association between capital structure and firm strategy. Scholars began
arguing for a reverse flow of ideas, from strategy to finance (Barton & Gordon,
1987). This was driven by a lack of consensus in finance over an optimal capital
structure (Myers, 1984): “we know little about capital structure...our theories
don’t seem to explain actual financing behavior” (1984: 575). Barton and Gordon
argued for the unique opportunity for strategy by contributing to the
interdisciplinary capital structure debate by bringing it to the level of the firm.

Barton and Gordon claimed that conventional economic and financial
theory seeking to explain capital structure was focused on industry or financial
variables at the firm level. Thus, there was a relative neglect of non-financial
considerations at the firm level. They argued that the potential contributions of
strategy to the capital structure debate center on: firm level analysis, incorporation
of top management team decisions and idiosyncrasies; and finally, going beyond
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economic and financial goals to incorporate the multiple social and behavioral
factors driving different stakeholders in the firm.

Subsequent capital structure research in management has built on these
ideas. Studies incorporating capital structure as leverage, i.e., composed of
homogeneous debt and equity (n = 17), are summarized in Table 1. The first three
of these papers are theoretical and have been discussed above. Key papers
investigating the association between firm capital structure and the strategic
actions of diversification and innovation are discussed below.

Debt and Diversification
Diversification is a key managerial policy lever for adapting to a
constantly changing competitive landscape in the pursuit of superior performance
(Schendel & Hofer, 1979). The difference between related and unrelated
diversification are closely tied to the nature of firm resources (Kochhar & Hitt,
1998), these in turn are closely linked to firm competitive advantage (Chatterjee
& Wernerfelt, 1991) and its future performance (Palich, Cardinal, & Miller,
2000). Fundamentally, the association between firm leverage and diversification
rests on the redeployability of firm assets in case of default. Generally, firm
specific assets (concomitant with related diversification) have a positive
association with equity financing (i.e. lower leverage) since they are considered
riskier for debt holders. Some of the seminal works in this literature are reviewed
below.
16

Considering that the catalyst for capital structure research in strategy was
a debate over the managerial role in mitigating firm level unsystematic risk, it is
not surprising that researchers turned their attention to corporate debt and default
risk (Sandberg, Lewellen, & Stanley, 1987). Combining an analytical and
empirical study, Sandberg et al. (1987) proposed that historical standard
deviations of firm return on assets (ROA) are sufficient in determining its
probability of earnings shortfalls. Invoking signaling arguments (Ross, 1977), the
authors suggest that firms should carry high leverage to communicate confidence
to both capital markets and competitors, as well as to fend off any potential
takeover bids. Since debt increases unsystematic firm risk, diversification became
a common strategic outcome of interest for early strategy scholars.

However, in another initial study (Lubatkin & O'Neill, 1987)
diversification was posited to leave unsystematic risk unaffected since managerial
overconfidence (in case of related diversification) may add administrative risks.
Instead, related diversification mitigates systematic risk as the firm’s market
power increases and it is able to leverage its resources, capabilities, knowledge
and economies over multiple related businesses. This allows firms to withstand
exogenous shocks better than less diversified firms (1987: 670). Lubatkin and
O’Neill found support for this in their sample of 297 U.S. mergers between 1954
and 1973.
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In a follow-up empirical study (Barton & Gordon, 1988) to their earlier
theoretical work (Barton & Gordon, 1987), Barton and Gordon found that
managerial choice regarding diversification is associated with capital structure. In
fact, the relationships between the financial variables and capital structure are
contingent upon strategy (1988: 629). Generally, debt was negatively associated
with profitability, but positively associated with sales growth. Specifically, related
(diversification) and single business firms had the lowest debt levels. On the other
hand, unrelated firms had the highest. These studies, while methodologically
elementary compared to modern diversification investigations, were critical in
establishing the association between capital structure and strategic actions and
catalyzing the interest of strategy scholars. A subsequent replication of Barton and
Gordon (1988) using Australian data (Lowe, Naughton, & Taylor, 1994; Taylor &
Lowe, 1995) suggested that capital markets reward focused firms since they are
easier to understand, findings in line with research on the conglomerate discount
(Benner, 2007).

The rising influence of the resource-based view (Barney, 1991;
Wernerfelt, 1984) was evident in a study by Chatterjee and Wernerfelt (1991).
They found that firm diversification strategy was predicated on the nature of its
unutilized (or under-utilized) resources. Firms with excess knowledge and
external financial resources (equity capital) are associated with related
diversification. Excess internal financial resources (including debt capacity) was
associated with unrelated diversification (Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991).
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Interestingly, in both high and low performing firms, innovation was associated
with related diversification.

Kocchar and Hitt (1998) investigated the debt and diversification linkage
through a transaction cost lens. They found that the capital structure and strategy
association is reciprocal as changes in asset specificity combine with capital
market imperfections. For example, prior research (Chatterjee & Wernerfelt,
1991) suggests that nature of resources affect firm diversification strategy.
However, the nature of diversification itself is associated with capital structure
and firm’s resource profile (Kochhar & Hitt, 1998). Generally, equity financing is
linked with related diversification and firm specific assets.

This link between capital structure, strategy and firm resources was further
developed in a paper linking the nature of resources with capital structure
(Vicente-Lorente, 2001). Vicente-Lorente argued that opaque and firm specific
resources reduce a firm’s borrowing capacity. This creates a fundamental
contradiction between the goal of following a resource based strategy (Barney,
1991) and seeking the lowest cost financing. This problem echoes the second
conundrum raised by Bettis (1983) that highlighted an inconsistency between the
transparency sought by capital providers and the strategic opacity required for
competitive advantage. Thus, capital market imperfections may create
insurmountable challenges for smaller or younger firms trying to grow by
pursuing a resource driven strategy. This swing in the pendulum (Hoskisson, Hitt,

19

Wan, & Yiu, 1999) is ironic since it was firm level resource heterogeneity that
was used to invoke the importance of strategy to the capital structure literature
(Barton & Gordon, 1987). However, that very resource heterogeneity (especially
if concomitant with resource opacity) may make financing expensive and the
capital structure choice difficult.

The issue of strategic opacity becomes more nuanced in the presence of
environmental dynamism. For example, the leverage and diversification
association is moderated by environmental dynamism (Ngah-Kiing Lim et al.,
2009). Their sample of 245 Singaporean listed firms from 1995 to 2000 reveals
counterintuitive findings. Under stable conditions, unrelated diversification is
associated with low debt while under dynamic conditions, such firms take on
more debt. The authors argue that this unexpected result maybe driven by country
effects (Singaporean firms being smaller on average than U.S. firms) due to which
Singaporean firms maybe using the complexity and information asymmetries
created by environmental dynamism to raise their debt levels. Such findings
suggest that firm strategies pertaining to diversification are inexorably linked to
firm financing since changes in firm resources modify its risk profile in the eyes
of capital providers.

Debt and Innovation
Strategy research over the last few decades has shifted its focus from
industry levels of analysis to investigations of firm-level heterogeneity
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(Hoskisson et al., 1999) , exemplified by the resource based view (Barney, 1991;
Penrose, 1959). One of the key drivers of this firm-level heterogeneity is
innovation. Similar to a related diversification strategy, the pursuit of innovation
centers on the use of under- or un-used firm productive services (including
managerial resources) for the introduction of new combinations of resources, i.e.
innovation (Penrose, 1959: 85). However, such an emphasis on innovation is
likely to create firm specific assets that increase the riskiness of debt. This is
because firm R & D not only serves as a “stock of strategic resources such as
innovative capabilities” (Vincente-Lorente, 2001: 162), but also proxies for the
relative importance the firm gives to innovation (O'Brien, 2003). Some seminal
papers linking firm leverage with innovation are reviewed below.

Balakrishna and Fox (1993) proclaimed the primacy of firm-level
heterogeneity in explaining capital structure. Using transaction cost arguments,
they posited that firm specific effects contribute the most to leverage suggesting
strong links between strategy and capital structure. These firm specific attributes
are far more important than industry level factors in determining firm capital
structure. For example, asset specificity (measured by R & D) is negatively
related to debt in their sample of 295 U.S. firms. However, reputational assets
(measured by advertising intensity) were positively related to debt. A
contemporaneous study (Long & Ravenscraft, 1993) found a similar negative
association between debt and innovation. However, in their context of 72
leveraged buyouts between 1981 and 1987, the authors argued that this decline
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(LBOs led to 40% decline in R & D intensity) was attributable to the agency role
of debt in disciplining managers by reducing discretionary spending in pet
projects, including R & D.

A more recent paper (O'Brien, 2003) argued that slack plays a key role for
firms following a strategy of innovation. This is both because innovation
capabilities are cumulative (Dierickx & Cool, 1989) and require regular
expenditures as well as because such innovative firms may acquire outside
capabilities to complement their own stock of resources (Ahuja & Katila, 2001;
Kogut & Zander, 1992). Both these factors along with prior research on intangible
assets suggest that firms pursuing a strategy of innovation (R & D intensity at 90
percentile of industry) will prioritize slack and therefore have lower leverage.
Furthermore, in his sample of 16,358 U.S. firms between 1980 and 1999 O’Brien
found that innovative firms with low or median leverage saw positive
performance effects.

The studies discussed above treated capital structure as simply leverage,
i.e., the implicit assumption being that debt and equity are homogeneous. These
studies have found that debt and diversification are linked primarily due to
diversification’ role in shuffling of firm resources. These resources in turn change
the riskiness of the firm for its capital providers. In the context of innovation,
there is an increase in the stock of firm specific assets, which have lower
redeployability in case of default. Thus, generally, slack and equity are preferable,
compared to debt, when it comes to financing innovation. Theoretically,
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environmental dynamism is expected to raise riskiness of firm strategies, as has
been shown in U.S. samples (Simerly & Li, 2000). However, such findings may
not hold in international institutional settings (Ngah-Kiing Lim et al., 2009; OforiDankwa & Julian, 2013). The evolution of this literature discussed above and its
insightful findings suggest that a more realistic incorporation of capital structure –
i.e., recognition of heterogeneity between and within different debt holder and
equity holder groups – offers to increase our understanding of the capital structure
and strategy relationship. The next set of papers reviewed take on part of this
challenge by being cognizant of heterogeneity amongst equity holders.

Equity Heterogeneity

Scholars investigating the changing corporate governance landscape of the
1980’s also realized the theoretical gains to be made by integrating capital
structure and strategy research. Unlike the Berle and Means (1932) era, corporate
America was witnessing a surge in institutional ownership of firms that belies the
myth of dispersion of ownership (Holderness, 2009). From a mere 16% in the
1960’s, institutional investors came to own 57% of U.S. corporate equity by 2000
(Ryan & Schneider, 2002). This upward trend grows unabated, by 2010
institutional investors owned 67% of U.S. equities by market capitalization
(Aguilar, 2013; Blume & Keim, 2012). Instead of dispersion of stockholdings and
separation of ownership and control, the corporate landscape witnessed the rise of
institutions whose influence was felt by firms either through direct actions or
through stock sell-offs (Porter, 1992).
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These changes swept the governance landscape as the reversal of
dispersed ownership combined with equity holders need to curb managerial
tendency to entrench themselves (Davis & Thompson, 1994). In order to
understand these developments and their associations with firm strategy, scholars
began incorporating differences between equity holder groups as a key
explanatory variable. Extant literature categorizes this research under the rubric of
ownership as governance (Connelly et al., 2010a; Daily et al., 2003b). This
literature forms the lion’s share of capital structure research in strategy, and is
reviewed below. See Table 2 for an overview of these articles. Seminal articles
investigating the links between firm equity holders and innovation, diversification
and firm performance are discussed below.

Equity holders and Innovation
The 1980’s were a decade of soul searching for American business.
Globalization, especially the rise of Japan, was making both academic and
corporate strategists realize the impact of corporate governance and ownership on
competitiveness. A belief took hold that “the U.S. system of allocating investment
capital both within and across companies appears to be failing” (Porter, 1992: 4).
This institutional myopia logic was the key impetus for studies into the impact of
equity holder concentration, and later equity holder types, on firm innovation.
Investigations into the cause of this broader phenomena led scholars to identify
different groups and types of equity holders as a key antecedent to firm
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innovation, these investigations continue to this day and form the biggest subset
of the equity holder heterogeneity literature.

An early study (Graves, 1988) was motivated by the anecdotal nature of
the investor myopia accusation – i.e., institutional investors being negatively
associated with firm investments in R & D and other long-term projects. In his
sample of computer manufacturers between 1976 and 1985, Graves found that,
ceteris paribus, institutional ownership was negatively associated with R & D. He
concluded that this innovation suppression effect might be hampering U.S.
international competitiveness. Contradicting these findings, another study (Hill &
Snell, 1988) of research intensive industries established that stock concentration
was positively associated with innovation. However, contrary to agency
expectations, proportion of outside directors on board was negatively associated
with innovation.

Baysinger and colleagues found results confirming the positive effects of
insiders on boards on innovation in their sample of 176 Fortune 500 firms from
1980 (Baysinger, Kosnik, & Turk, 1991). These results were contrary to the longheld belief that innovation creates an employment risk for managers that cannot
be diversified away, like financial risk (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). However, the
association between stock concentration and innovation was mixed. Stock
concentration amongst institutions was positively associated with innovation and
concentration amongst individuals was negatively associated with innovation.
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Thus, they argued, the positive impact of stock concentration on R & D is largely
attributable to institutional investors.

More evidence against investor myopia kept accumulating (Hansen &
Hill, 1991). In a 10-year longitudinal study of 129 firms, Hansen and Hill found
that institutional investors are positively (but weakly) associated with innovation.
Cash and debt were also positively associated with innovation, while insider
holdings gave mixed results. Contrasting myopic investors with efficient market
hypothesis, Hansen and Hill argued that the sole empirical result in favor of
myopic investors (Graves, 1988) was an artifact of sample and methodological
choices. They further posited two potential explanations for the positive
association between institutional investors and innovation. First, using a weak
form of efficient market hypothesis, the short-termism of equity holders maybe
attributed to individual equity holders who lack the capabilities required for
thorough firm analysis. This is in stark contrast to the highly capable research
capabilities of institutions, i.e., institutions are superior investors. This is a
persistent belief since percentage of outstanding shares held by a firm’ largest
institutional investors has been associated with a perception of information
advantage (Schnatterly, Shaw, & Jennings, 2008). The second possibility is that
the large holdings of institutions make exits expensive, thereby leading to a “lockin”.
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The mounting evidence against the myopic investor hypothesis raised
another question: is their any heterogeneity in the effect of different institutions
and their impact on innovation? To answer this question, Kocchar and David
(1996) utilized a categorization developed in financial economics (Brickley,
Lease, & Smith, 1988) that classified institutional investors based on their
susceptibility to management pressure. Institutions that may in some way be
dependent on firms for business, such as banks and insurance companies, are
classified as pressure-sensitive. Those that have no business with firms, such as
public pension funds and mutual funds, are classified as pressure-resistant. Those
institutions that fall into neither category, such as corporate pension funds, are
classified as pressure-indeterminate.

In a sample of 135 U.S. manufacturing firms, Kochhar and David (1996)
find that pressure-resistant institutional investors are positively associated with
innovation (measured as new product announcements). Kochhar and David
interpret this as support for their “active investor” hypothesis and rejection of both
the myopic investor and superior investor hypotheses, since only pressureresistant investors were associated with innovation. The lack of support for the
superior investor hypothesis was a significant finding and foreshadowed
subsequent works in accounting that measured actual investor behavior and
confirmed the prevalence of stock indexing amongst institutions (Bushee, 1998;
Bushee, 2001).
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Once the association between active investors and innovation was
established, the question of the nature of this activism arose. David et al. (2001)
found that institutional investor activism has positive and both short and longterm association with R & D inputs (i.e. expenditures). Specifically, one instance
of activism (proxy-based) raises R & D inputs by 0.05% in the subsequent year
and 0.025% over the long-term. These are not insignificant as they represent 9%
and 44% respectively of within-firm standard deviation of R & D expenditures
(2001: 149). Interestingly, activism has an indirect effect on R & D outputs (new
product announcements) via R & D inputs (David et al., 2001). These findings
corroborated the cumulative research till date, namely that equity holder
heterogeneity was a critical factor in explaining firm-level variance in innovation.

Institutional ownership and board governance factors were combined in
another investigation of the antecedents of innovation (Hoskisson et al., 2002). In
their sample of 234 U.S. firms between 1985 and 1991, these scholars found that
pension funds were positively associated with internal innovation (R & D
expenditures) while investment funds were associated with external innovation
(acquisitions). The authors argue that this is driven by the long-time horizons of
pension funds that match the longer payoff periods of internal R & D projects.
Similarly, investment manager short-term incentives match the faster market entry
that acquisitions enable. Upholding previous findings (Baysinger et al., 1991; Hill
& Snell, 1988), insider board members were associated with greater internal
innovation. Interestingly, outsider board members were associated with external
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innovation. These findings on innovation mirror those on corporate venturing,
which is negatively associated with outsiders on the board and positively
associated with executive stock options and long-term institutional investors
(Zahra, 1996).

The equity holder and innovation association received nuanced support
from a multi-country study (Lee & O'Neill, 2003) that contrasted the U.S. with
Japan. Lee and O’Neill found similar positive associations between concentrated
ownership in the U.S. but no effect in Japan. Furthermore, Japanese firms on
average spend more on R & D suggesting that unlike the agency issues
dominating the U.S. environment, Japanese managers are driven by stewardship
concerns that align their incentives with equity holders – even if these equity
holders are dispersed.

The Lee and O’Neill (2003) study brought out sharp distinctions between
the markets for corporate control and the prevalent corporate governance
paradigms (agency vs. stewardship) operating in the U.S. as opposed to countries
like Japan. These differences imply that managerial incentives are likely to be
important in the context of U.S. where agency problems seem to be more severe.
A study of 250 U.S. firms (Sanders & Carpenter, 2003) revealed that one way in
which managers balance the interests of short-term equity holders with the longterm interests of firms is through stock buybacks. The presence of information
asymmetries (measured by R & D) between the firm and its equity holders
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increases the prevalence of stock repurchases as a mollifying mechanism.
Furthermore, such “strategic satisficing” (2003: 166, 171) is more likely under
conditions of unmet performance expectations and high CEO stock options.

Kim and colleagues (2008) explored the principal-principal conflict and its
impact on the association between slack and innovation. A key tenet of the
behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963) is that organizational slack
encourages risk-taking and experimentation exemplified by innovation. However
this relationship is inverted-U shaped as it reverses at high levels of slack (Nohria
& Gulati, 1996). In a sample of 253 Korean firms between 1998-2003, Kim and
colleagues found that equity holders are differentially associated with this
relationship (Kim, Kim, & Lee, 2008). Increasing ownership by foreigners and
domestic institutions weakens the positive relationship between slack and
innovation. Such owners further increase the negative relationship between slack
and innovation (at higher levels of slack).

A recent paper (O'Brien & David, 2014) argues that the differences
between the U.S. and Japan are driven primarily by the differing regimes both
corporate cultures operate under. American firms follow a contractarian regime,
while Japanese firms follow a communitarian regime in which reciprocity and
embeddedness reign. In their sample of 2,123 Japanese firms (18,283 firm-year
observations) between 1992 and 2004, the authors find that the pattern of
problemistic search (Cyert & March, 1963) is similar to those found in other
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contexts, but R & D intensity will increase more for communitarian firms (those
with domestic equity holders). Furthermore, communitarian Japanese firms raise
their R & D search more than other contractarian firms (i.e. transactional or
foreign owners) when performance exceeds expectations, since such
communitarian firms tend to invest in growth opportunities. In contrast, firms
with high transactional ownership cut R & D as performance rises above
aspirations.

In summary, the last thirty years (1983-2013) have seen the capital
structure and innovation debate come full circle. From early concerns of U.S.
firms being at a disadvantage due to differing financial paradigms operating in
countries with low cost of capital (Bettis, 1983), to concerns over investor myopia
(Graves, 1988; Porter, 1992), research has found that equity holder heterogeneity
has material impact on firm innovation strategies and that these vary with country
contexts. Strategy research has also elaborated the nature of the mechanisms
linking equity holder heterogeneity with innovation, ranging from transaction and
agency costs to behavioral considerations. I next turn my attention to the literature
linking equity holders with firm restructuring and diversification.

Equity holders, Restructuring and Diversification
Along with concerns about U.S. competitiveness and lack of investment in
innovation, a parallel and prominent conversation in the 1980’s was
diversification. The core arguments in the early investigations centered on the
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disciplining influence of concentrated equity holders. Such concentrated equity
holders have both the incentive and the clout to ensure that the link between firm
diversification and performance remains positive.

These concerns are evident in the study by Hill and Snell (1988) that
investigated links between firm equity holder concentration and the strategic
actions of innovation and diversification. Their findings on innovation have been
discussed in the previous section. In their sample of 94 research-intensive U.S.
firms, contrary to expectations, proportion of outsiders on the board was
positively associated with diversification. Such unrelated diversification was
negatively associated with profitability, a finding confirmed by recent metaanalysis (Palich et al., 2000). However, stockholder concentration was associated
with more focused firms (Hill & Snell, 1988), a finding that corroborates prior
work in economics (Amihud & Lev, 1981).

A pair of papers (Bethel & Liebeskind, 1993; Gibbs, 1993) featured in a
special issue of the Strategic Management Journal (Vol. 14, 1993) on corporate
restructuring further investigated the governance and capital structure antecedents
of restructuring (changes in firm’s business portfolios and/or financial structure).
In their sample of 93 firms, Bethel and Liebeskind found that a combination of
agency and environmental factors were behind the restructuring wave. Firms
“restructured in the 1980’s when opportunities arose, but only when pressured by
blockholders” (1993: 16). Specifically, they find that firms with blockholders at
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the outset of the restructuring wave (1981) were more likely to restructure. On the
other hand, emergence of blockholders in firms with previously diffused
ownership was negatively associated with firm growth and diversification. They
interpret this finding in terms of the efficiency enhancing and disciplining
influence of blockholders, leaving less room for later restructuring. The effect of
institutional equity holders was opposite; they were positively associated with
firm growth.

Financial restructuring (firms taking on debt and carrying out stock
repurchases) is a key prescription of the free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986).
Free cash flow is a necessary but not sufficient condition under the free cash
model of agency costs, the other two conditions are existence of governance
problems and the threat of takeover as a catalyst for restricting. Gibbs (1993)
found that restructuring was motivated by such agency costs. In his sample of 70
U.S. firms, Gibbs found that initial level of diversification was related to
subsequent restructuring. High board power (product of proportion of outside
directors and their tenure divided by tenure of insiders on the board) is associated
with less restructuring. The management equity hypothesis was not supported.

The two key explanations for restructuring emerging in the literature at
this time were inadequate governance and prior unrelated diversification. Scholars
(Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1994) suggested that there was a causal order
linking inadequate governance, strategy, firm performance and finally, divestment
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activity. In their sample of 203 U.S. firms between 1985 and 1990, Hoskissson
and colleagues find that non-board member blockholders are associated with
lower diversification. In turn, high levels of diversification are associated with
higher debt intensity as well as an increase in divestment intensity.

At this point in the evolution of the capital structure literature, a key
debate arose on the association between equity holder concentration and
diversification. The crucial explanatory mechanism in strategy research linking
capital structure and diversification rests on agency arguments (Eisenhardt, 1989;
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Specifically, managerial propensities are directed
towards reducing their employment risks. Therefore, lack of equity holder
oversight (either direct or indirect through the board of directors) is associated
with higher levels of unrelated diversification (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Hill &
Snell, 1988) which in turn are detrimental to firm performance (Palich et al.,
2000). This core narrative has not gone unchallenged (Lane, Cannella Jr, &
Lubatkin, 1998).

In a substantial replication and extension of the original Amihud and Lev
(1981) study, Lane et al. (1998) invoked Bettis’ (1983) arguments on the
paradigmatic differences between financial economics and strategy. Lane and
colleagues argued that these differences and the growth of the management
literature suggest that reiterating the agency theoretic links between inadequate
governance and unrelated diversification based primarily on Amihud and Lev was
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erroneous. In two separate datasets, one from the 1960’s replicating Amihud and
Lev’s original data and another from the 1980’s, Lane et al. (1998) found no
association between capital structure (stockholder concentration to signify owner
control), board vigilance and corporate strategy (diversification). The authors
claim that this lack of support for agency arguments for the equity holder and
diversification link (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Hill & Snell, 1988) suggest that the
negative assumptions of managerial behavior in public corporations has been
overblown, instead stewardship theory may be a better explanatory mechanism
for this association.

Lane et al.’s refutation of the agency links between equity holders and
diversification received its own strong rebuttals. Lack of statistical power in the
subgroup samples and the cumulative evidence developing in financial economics
in favor of agency arguments linking equity holder concentration and
diversification were one set of critiques (Amihud & Lev, 1999). These suggest,
“corporate risk strategy and corporate acquisitions are affected by agency
problems, proxied by ownership structure” (1999: 1068). This conclusion was
confirmed by others on the basis of mounting empirical evidence in favor of a link
between equity holder heterogeneity, corporate risk-taking (Wright, Ferris, Sarin,
& Awasthi, 1996) as well as diversification (Denis, Denis, & Sarin, 1999).
However, the debate remains open due to paradigmatic differences between
financial economics and strategy (Bettis, 1983; Lane, Cannella Jr, & Lubatkin,
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1999), although it has been suggested that these differences rest primarily on
measurement problems (Boyd, Gove, & Hitt, 2005).

Nonetheless, further support for the equity holder heterogeneity and
diversification link came from a study (Tihanyi et al., 2003) of 197 U.S. firms.
Tihanyi and colleagues found that the due to alignment between interests and time
horizons, international diversification was favored by both professional
investment funds and pension funds. In addition, insider director incentives
positively moderate the relationship between pension fund ownership and
international diversification. While outsider directors moderate the relationship
between professional investment funds and international diversification. The
authors argue this is because insider director incentives (especially long-term)
better align their interests with long-term pension funds. In case of investment
funds, outsider directors amplify the monitoring capabilities of the board that
catalyzes support for strategic actions like international diversification.

The debate outlined above had two characteristics germane to this review:
First, it centered on the purported link or lack thereof between equity holder
concentration (measures of concentrated stockholdings) and diversification, at a
time when scholars had already begun to address the issue of equity holder
heterogeneity, i.e. actual types (Brickley et al., 1988) and behaviors (Bushee,
1998) of different equity holders. Second, all the studies that were core to the
debate were U.S. centric and were thus open to the critique of being contextual
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and not internationally generalizable. This has changed in recent years as scholars
have investigated the equity holder heterogeneity and diversification link in
international samples (Colpan, Yoshikawa, Hikino, & Del Brio, 2011; David,
O'Brien, Yoshikawa, & Delios, 2010; Ramaswamy, Li, & Veliyath, 2002).

In one of the early strategy studies in an international context,
Ramaswamy et al. (2002) posited that country contexts matter since these
influence both ownership types and the monitoring disposition of the principals.
In their sample of 88 Indian manufacturing companies, they found that pressuresensitive investors (Brickley et al., 1988) such as banks are associated with
unrelated diversification while pressure-resistant investors like mutual funds are
negatively associated with unrelated diversification. Raising concerns that
simplistic stockholder concentration ratios (e.g. Lane et al. 1998) may mask
agency effects, the authors (Ramaswamy et al., 2002) however concede that lack
of significant findings linking pressure-indeterminate investors (government
agencies) and foreign investors with diversification may represent a boundary
condition for agency theorizing as alluded to by Lane et al. (1998).

In contrast to the small sample of Indian firms used by Ramaswamy and
colleagues, significant relationship between equity holder heterogeneity and the
drivers of diversification were found in a sample of 1,180 Japanese firms (David
et al., 2010). Using the relational vs. transactional lens, David et al. (2010) argue
that Japanese domestic ownership is relational in nature and reflects priorities
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other than pure profit maximization. On the other hand, foreign owners are
primarily focused on rent appropriation through profit, reflecting their
transactional orientation. Relational owners seek sales and employment growth
via international diversification as opposed to transactional owners who seek
profit growth. Thus, equity holder heterogeneity is associated with the
performance goals of firms.

Another study investigated the evolving landscape of Japanese corporate
governance (Colpan et al., 2011) as it shifted from relational to more transactional
or market oriented ownership in the 1990’s. The authors argue that global
institutional investors are the primary drivers of change – from a relational to a
transactional governance culture. Domestic corporate investors are their polar
opposites, still adhering to a strongly relational culture that values long term
capital commitments. Finally, between these two are domestic financial
institutions that are trying to balance their relationships with firms with their
responsibilities towards investors, i.e., these institutions are influenced by firm
performance. Using a sample of 96 electronic firms, Colpan and colleagues find
that product diversification is negatively associated with foreign institutional
ownership and positively with domestic corporate ownership. Further, firm
performance moderates the relationship between domestic financial institutions
and capital investments. This suggests that for institutions straddling the
relational-transactional divide, firm performance determines their support for
strategic investments.
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Equity holders and Firm Performance

Being residual claimants, equity holders are particularly concerned about
firm performance as they bear risks of any monitoring failure. These risks are
exacerbated for outside equity holders who suffer from information asymmetries
with respect to firm management. Outside equity holders have been incorporated
in the literature as blockholders, institutional investors and finally, different types
of institutional investors. Blockholders in a firm, investors with a 5% or higher
equity stake, are motivated by concentrated ownership and private benefits
(Connelly et al., 2010a). Non-board member blockholders have been found to be
positively associated with both accounting and market-based performance
measures. However, when the number of such blockholders is controlled for, the
total equity held by non-board blockholders has a negative association with
accounting performance (Hoskisson et al., 1994). In case of corporations
becoming blockholders in other corporations, improved performance is seen if the
target firm is a supplier or customer. This suggest that partial vertical integration
(Bogert, 1996) enhances performance by reducing transaction costs.

Institutional investors have been found to be positively associated with
return on equity (Chaganti & Damanpour, 1991). Furthermore, executive equity
holdings and institutional holdings have a supplemental effect on firm
performance in terms of return on assets, return on equity and price-earnings
ratios. Chaganti and Damanpour argue that this alignment between executive and
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institutional equity holdings is in line with agency predictions. However, the
insider ownership and performance relationship is stronger under conditions of
environmental dynamism (Li & Simerly, 1998). This suggests that environmental
dynamism is a major factor in the ability of owners to comprehend firm strategies,
an area that has not received adequate attention in the literature. This is in contrast
to the rich literature on debt and environmental dynamism (see earlier section on
homogeneous debt and equity).

Consistent with agency predictions, concentrated ownership has been
found to be positively associated with firm performance in Japan (Gedajlovic &
Shapiro, 2002) as well as European samples (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). Such a
positive association between ownership concentration and firm performance is
also observed in the context of IPO firms (Bruton, Filatotchev, Chahine, &
Wright, 2010). However, it has been argued that the relationship is inverse of
agency predictions in case of business groups as controlling shareholders exploit
insider information to increase their stakes in the most profitable and promising
firms (Chang, 2003). Dalton et al.’s meta-analysis reports a similar equivocality
and fails to find any substantive relationship between blockholder or institutional
equity holders and firm performance (2003: 19).

Researchers have also considered the link between different
categorizations of institutional investors and firm performance. In one such study,
equity holders in the form of affiliated firms are negatively associated with firm
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performance; but, market investors and pension funds have a positive association
with firm performance in a Japanese sample (Gedajlovic, Yoshikawa, &
Hashimoto, 2005). However, this reveals one key weakness of equity holder
heterogeneity research in management, namely institutional investor
categorizations based on type. This may be one of the key factors leading to
confused findings (Daily et al., 2003) since with few exceptions (Connelly et al.,
2010b), management research has assumed stability in principal intentions and
incentives; thereby ignoring “the changing nature of principal interests over time”
(2010b: 726).

In summary, the key insights developed by this flourishing subset of the
capital structure literature can be bifurcated into two themes. On the one hand we
have differences that are driven by variations in the intentions and incentives of
the equity holders. On the other hand, scholars argue that these equity holder
differences are a function of the institutional differences across countries (OforiDankwa & Julian, 2013) which belies the notion of convergence in corporate
governance practices across the world (Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009). Such an
international institutional differences hypothesis is an especially common driver
of research contrasting U.S. and Japanese contexts (David, Yoshikawa, Chari, &
Rasheed, 2006; O'Brien & David, 2014; Yoshikawa, Phan, & David, 2005).
The first, and more germane to this dissertation, of these differences
centers on the categorization of institutional equity holders. In finance, the most
common categorization centers on susceptibility of institutions to managerial
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pressures (Brickley et al., 1988). Although the Brickley et al. categorization has
on occasion been adopted in management research (Kochhar & David, 1996;
Ramaswamy et al., 2002), an even more common categorization is simply
institutions by type. In such cases, intentions and incentives are attributed to
institutional fund mangers based on the type of institution; for example, long-term
orientation to pension fund managers (Hoskisson et al., 2002; Neubaum & Zahra,
2006). These categorizations are in contrast to the ones developed in accounting
that incorporate actual investor behavior (Bushee, 1998; Bushee, 2001) and have
been fruitfully applied in management research (Connelly et al., 2010b). In spite
of these shortcomings, the equity holder heterogeneity literature has underscored
the varied associations of equity holder groups with firm strategic actions. These
linkages also suggest that the ambiguous findings plaguing equity holder and firm
performance research maybe a result of ignoring the intervening strategic actions.
Thus, this review suggests new directions for capital structure research by further
integrating strategic actions into corporate governance research along equity
holders with a more realistic categorization of equity holders.
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Debt Heterogeneity

The most common conceptions of capital structure in the management
literature are leverage (i.e. ratios incorporating debt and equity, assumed
homogeneous) and equity holder heterogeneity. Debt is assumed to be
homogeneous in these literatures. This assumption is contradicted by both the
financial intermediation literature (Boot, 2000) as well as studies in management
which indicate lender influence via the board of directors (Stearns & Mizruchi,
1993). Furthermore, different types of debt holders influence firm financing
(Mizruchi & Stearns, 1994b), knowledge capabilities (Uzzi & Gillespie, 2002)
and innovation (David et al., 2008).
Corporate governance research has over the decades produced a
voluminous body of work investigating the impact of board composition on
various firm level outcomes (Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003a; Deutsch, 2005).
In spite of this substantial research, confusion and inconsistencies remain in the
literature regarding the empirical linkages between board composition and firm
level outcomes (Dalton & Dalton, 2011). It has been suggested that owing to the
multilevel context of board composition studies, these null results “may be a
function of the inadequacy of the analyses relied on…” (2011: 405). However, a
more parsimonious explanation may be that governance research in management
has largely ignored a key constituent of influence, namely lenders. Specifically,
there is a neglect of debt heterogeneity in much of management research (David
et al., 2008).
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Lender influence on the management of corporations has principally been
considered episodic and infrequent, triggered by events such as firm distress and
bankruptcy (Elloumi & Gueyie, 2001). However, an increasing tide of empirical
evidence refutes this assumption and demonstrates that lender influence on
governance of the firm is regular and frequent (Tung, 2009). In fact, these
findings show the wide span of “private lenders’ influence on corporations’
financing and investment decisions and operational matters” (2009: 117). In light
of these findings, it is likely that incorporating lender influence will help mitigate
the theoretical confusion and empirical insignificance that plagues the research
linking corporate governance with firm level outcomes. This lender influence is
evident both through relational debt (i.e. bank loans, which may involve board
representation) and transactional debt (i.e. bonds). Below, I briefly review the
literature exploring lender influence on firm management. An overview of key
debt heterogeneity papers in management can be seen in Table 3.

Bankers on Board
Banker representation on boards is usually found on large firms with
collateralizable assets and low dependence on short-term financing (Kroszner &
Strahan, 2001). This phenomenon of bankers on board is inherently a side effect,
as well as aggravating factor, of equity- and debt holder conflicts of interest.
Since the shareholders usually elect board members, bankers representing debt
holder interests create inescapable conflicts in the highest echelons of the
corporation as equity and debt have different risk bearing preferences and payoff
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structures (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). However, the fact that one-third of U.S.
public firms have a banker on board suggests that the benefits of monitoring
outweigh the costs associated with these conflicts (Kroszner & Strahan, 2001).

Research has indicated that use of debt financing by corporations is
influenced by having lender representatives on the board (Stearns & Mizruchi,
1993). However, there are indications that this influence is on the decline over
time, due to professionalization and internalization of the finance function as well
as greater environmental uncertainty (Mizruchi, Stearns, & Marquis, 2006). This
phenomena is evident from data which shows that while the average proportion of
outside directors in U.S. firms has steadily increased (53.2% in 1973 to 72.2% in
1994), there has been a proportional decline (27.6% of outside directors in 1973
vs. 12.7% in 1994) in banker representation on boards (data from Mizruchi et al
2006: 316).

Nevertheless, when considering overall representation on the board of
large firms (e.g. the S & P 500 in 2002) bankers were present on 27% of the
boards (Sisli-Ciamarra, 2012). Research has shown that creditor representation on
the board: “1) increases the amount of debt in a company’s capital structure via an
increase in private debt, 2) decreases the sensitivity of debt financing to the
amount of tangible assets that a company holds, 3) decreases the cost of
borrowing, and 4) reduces the pledge of collateral and financial covenants in debt
contracts” (2012: 665). In light of this, the proportional decline of bankers
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amongst outside directors found in the Mizruchi et al (2006) data may reflect
substitution of agency mitigating mechanisms between direct (relational)
monitoring through board positions and indirect (transactional) monitoring
through covenants and contracts.

Further complexity is added to banker representation on boards by the
finding that banker board member behavior depends on whether their bank is a
lender or non-lending board member (Byrd & Mizruchi, 2005), i.e., whether there
is a conflict between the bankers fiduciary responsibilities and self-interest. The
authors found that presence of a lending banker on the board is reflected
negatively on the firm’s debt ratio; while, the presence of a non-lending banker on
the board has influence depending on the firm’s level of distress risks. In case of
firms with high distress risk, non-lending bankers provide legitimacy/certification
along with expertise. For low distress risk firms, non-lending bankers carry out
the role of monitors.

Consequently, we can see that debt holder representation on the board is
variegated and contextual. Contrary to the popular assumption in much of
management research, corporate governance is not merely the domain of
shareholders and their representatives on the board, but is significantly and
frequently influenced by lenders (Tung, 2009). Banker presence on the board
gives them informational and relational advantages (Boot, 2000; David et al.,
2008) that are hard to contract ex ante.
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Such findings highlight the mechanism linking ownership heterogeneity
and how it’s mirrored by heterogeneity in the board of directors. This
heterogeneity invariably gives rise to equity holder and debt holder conflicts that
potentially influence strategic actions. For example there is empirical evidence
(Hilscher & Sisli-Ciamarra, 2011) that firms with creditor-directors indulge in
acquisitions (more diversifying) that destroy shareholder wealth. Thus, the
phenomena of bankers on board highlights a fundamental heterogeneity in debt
that has been overlooked by most of management research (David et al., 2008) –
namely, the difference between transactional and relational debt (Boot, 2000).
Transactional vs. Relational Debt
In the case of strategic actions like innovation, transaction cost perspective
(David et al., 2008; Wang & Thornhill, 2010) suggests that the strategic fit
between the governance structure and the firm’s strategic action affects firm
performance. In a rare study incorporating debt heterogeneity, David et al. (2008)
posited that the choice of governance structure is molded by the need to mitigate
three types of transaction hazards: one, asset specificity, which limits asset
redeployment; two, uncertainty about both the transaction and the counterparty;
and third, appropriability risk. Thus, transactions exposing firms and their capital
providers to such hazards will seek governance structures that enable dispute
resolution, adaptation (i.e. forbearance) and monitoring.

David et al. (2008) found that relational debt, with hierarchical governance
features, is positively associated with innovation. Furthermore, the alignment
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between a strategy of innovation and relational debt led to higher performance.
Wang and Thornhill (2010) extended these arguments and found that the
association between relational debt and innovation is an inverted U-shape. This is
because although relational debt facilitates monitoring and adaptation, it requires
collateral that firms with very high R & D expenses may not have. Another
intriguing finding was that convertible debt has a U-shaped relationship with
innovation. Two opposing forces drive this relationship. Holders of convertible
debt cannot intervene in firm management but have the option of swapping their
securities for common stock. Firms focused on innovation are likely to have
higher valued convertible securities that have lower cost than conventional debt
(Wang & Thornhill, 2010).

Such a distinction is also evident in the context of diversification. In a
sample of Japanese firms (O'Brien et al., 2014), transactional debt (bonds) was
found to negatively affect performance more than relational debt. The authors
argue that the negative and inflexible connotations of debt largely pertain to
transactional debt. This is in contrast to relational debt (bank loans) that are
characterized by social embeddedness (Uzzi & Gillespie, 2002; Uzzi & Lancaster,
2003) between lenders and firms that confer advantages of reciprocity, knowledge
exchange and network transitivity. Thus, the original transaction cost bifurcation
of debt and equity as separate governance mechanisms (Williamson, 1988) can be
extended to different forms of debt as well as equity. These ideas are further
developed below.
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Capital Structure and Transaction Costs
Most of transaction cost theory’s application to the capital structure and
strategic action association implicitly invokes the differing governance attributes
of equity and debt (Williamson, 1988) and explicitly focuses on transaction
attributes such as uncertainty and asset specificity. However, the bifurcation of
the literature into separate streams of equity and debt heterogeneity reveals an
implicit assumption – namely, that equity and debt are simply financing choices.
Their governance attributes are only incidentally invoked in theoretical
explanations without any integrated analysis of commonalities and interactions
between different forms of debt holders and equity holders and the governance
structures they generate.

The governance attributes of patient (akin to hierarchy) and impatient
capital (akin to market) are critical since in the absence of optimum contracting
they determine the strategic fit between capital structure heterogeneity and firm
strategic actions (see Table 4). Assuming bounded rationality and agent
opportunism, these governance attributes determine if the strategic actions
followed by the risk takers (i.e. managers) are those preferred by the risk bearers
(i.e. capital providers).

Within strategy, transaction costs are one of the dominant explanatory
mechanism linking capital structure and strategic actions. Research has often
juxtaposed transaction cost and agency elements to develop (Kochhar, 1996) and
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test (Balakrishnan & Fox, 1993; O'Brien et al., 2014; Simerly & Li, 2000)
competing hypothesis. Kochhar (1996) pointed out that agency and transaction
cost theories differ fundamentally in their approach to capital structure.
Transaction cost theory (unlike agency) posits that markets can fail, debt and
equity both possess governance attributes with equity being the more powerful
and that the key asset under governance is not free cash flow but firm resources.
He argued that LBOs (leveraged buyouts), which increase firm debt load, are
more likely to occur in firms with low asset specificity.

Balakrishnan and Fox (1993) found that asset attributes of specificity and
intangibility are negatively associated with leverage because although such
investments may improve a firm’s competitive position, they are harder to
evaluate and monitor by lenders; this is especially true under conditions of
environmental dynamism (Simerly & Li, 2000). For the same reasons, related
diversification has also been found to be negatively associated with leverage
(Kochhar & Hitt, 1998). More recently, O’Brien et al. (2013) found that
management protected from the harsh market governance of transactional debt
(i.e. bonds) performs better by leveraging existing firm resources. Thus, following
transaction cost logic – the hierarchical governance of equity is preferable when
firms invest in strategic actions that develop highly specific and intangible
resources.
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In summary, the composition of capital structure itself has governance
features that are often ignored in strategy research (Barton & Gordon, 1987).
When considering strategic actions such as diversification and innovation that
entail managerial risk taking, capital structure heterogeneity across debt holders
and equity holders has been assumed away. Research till now has focused either
on equity holder or debt holder heterogeneity. We still do not know how the full
range of capital structure heterogeneity –between different equity and debtholders – influences strategic actions. Moreover, this bifurcation of the capital
structure literature – into separate equity and debt heterogeneity silos – leaves
important questions unanswered: What are the common underlying factors
driving the association between capital structure heterogeneity and strategic
actions? What are the interactions between these varied governance structures?

Unlike extant research, this dissertation incorporates capital structure
heterogeneity –across both debt holders and equity holders – as governance
structures (Ebers & Oerlemans, 2014; Weingast, 1993; Williamson, 1988) with
varied attributes and associations with strategic actions. In the next section
(chapter 3) I develop an integrated theoretical model of capital structure
heterogeneity and strategic actions that addresses these unanswered questions in
the literature. In addition to the de facto governance role of the capital structure, I
incorporate the de jure role of the board of directors and the association of
compensation as mediators of the association between capital structure
heterogeneity and strategic actions.
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CHAPTER 3
THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES
Strategy research has investigated the associations between capital
structure heterogeneity and strategic actions such as diversification and
innovation. However, these investigations bifurcate capital structure research into
two separate streams: one investigating equity holder heterogeneity, i.e.
ownership as governance (Daily et al., 2003b); and, another investigating debt
holder heterogeneity (David et al., 2008). Therefore, we still do not know the
associations between the full range of capital structure heterogeneity – across both
debt and equity – and strategic actions. Even when extant research explicitly
invoke transaction cost arguments, their separation of equity and debt
heterogeneity reveals an implicit assumption, entrenched in the conventional
view, of equity and debt as merely financing choices.

Although capital structure has been investigated within strategic
management for three decades, it suffers from a simplifying assumption in which
researchers of equity holder heterogeneity assume away debt holder heterogeneity
and vice versa. In this dissertation I argue that this implicit assumption limits our
understanding of the association between capital structure heterogeneity and
strategic actions. Such hidden assumptions limit theoretical advancement (Davis,
1971) and the explanatory power of management research by undermining its
closeness to reality (Foss & Hallberg, 2013). Strategic actions like diversification
and innovation are likely associated with the whole range of capital structure
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heterogeneity – across both debt and equity holders, which existing research
overlooks.

The division of extant research into isolated streams investigating equity
holder and debt holder heterogeneity and its associations with firm level outcomes
reflects the conventional view of equity and debt as simply financing choices.
Such a perspective allows for research that focuses on either equity or debt holder
heterogeneity while assuming the other homogenous. However, viewed from a
transaction cost lens, these heterogeneous groups of equity and debt holders
represent governance structures that are not bound by such simplifying
assumptions. Williamson (1988) argued that debt and equity have governance
attributes of markets (rules) and hierarchies (discretion) respectively. I extend this
transaction cost approach to different types of equity and debt holders. This
necessitates a simultaneous investigation of equity and debt holder heterogeneity.

Although distinct, equity holder and debt holder heterogeneity research
suggests that differences among providers of capital center on their varied
tolerance for risk and their investment time horizons. Therefore, I argue that the
dimensions underlying both debt holder and equity holder heterogeneity, i.e.,
dimensions driving their governance attributes, are the same. Such a framing
makes explicit what has till now been implicit in these disjointed literatures. Both
equity and debt holders can be categorized along these two dimensions that drive
their associations with strategic actions such as diversification and innovation.
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Therefore, I extend transaction cost economics conceptualization of capital
structure as governance structures (Williamson, 1988) to groups within debt and
equity. When viewed in this manner as governance structures, a question arises:
what drives the association between debt and equity holder heterogeneity with
strategic actions? I posit that the mechanisms linking capital structure
heterogeneity and strategic actions are executive compensation and the board of
directors.

In the following sections, I first draw on extant literature to integrate and
develop a categorization of heterogeneous debt holders and equity holders. Next, I
establish time horizons and risk tolerance as the two fundamental dimensions
driving the governance attributes of these diverse equity and debt holders.
Following that, I develop hypotheses that link these debt and equity holders to the
strategic actions of diversification and innovation. Finally, I argue that the board
of directors and executive compensation mediate these associations.

Capital Structure As Governance Structures: A Transaction Cost
Perspective

Capital structure refers to the mix of debt and equity used to finance a
firm. Different types of debt holders and equity holder groups constitute capital
structure heterogeneity. Unlike the extensive equity heterogeneity literature, debt
heterogeneity has seen limited theoretical and empirical research. In this section I
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first discuss different categorizations of these groups commonly used in the
literature. I go on to develop a new theoretical model that argues for
commonalities between debt and equity holders along the dimensions of risk
tolerance and time horizons. Development of these underlying dimensions gives
me the opportunity to treat a wide range of capital structure heterogeneity – across
debt and equity – as governance structures associated with firm strategic actions
like diversification and innovation.

Viewed from a transaction cost lens, debt and equity are de facto
governance structures (Williamson, 1988), akin to the de jure organizational
governance structures (Williamson, 1985; Williamson, 1991) that have been the
subject of significant research1. Misalignment between these governance
structures and strategic actions creates maladaptation costs that can be avoided by
“judicious use of governance structure…rather than merely realigning incentives”
(Williamson, 1988: 572). Such a transaction cost framework differs from the ex
ante incentive alignment emphasis of agency theory.

In addition to maladaptation costs, the transaction cost perspective
emphasizes other ex post costs such as haggling costs (to correct misalignment),
setup costs and bonding costs (securing commitments). I argue, in line with
Williamson (1988), that the governance structures embedded in capital structure
have been neglected in research as opposed to their organizational counterparts.
1

For a recent review of governance structures and theoretical extension of hybrid forms of
governance, see Ebers, M. & Oerlemans, L. 2014. The Variety of Governance Structures Beyond
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Furthermore, by bifurcating capital structure research into separate streams, extant
research ignores the additive and interactive associations between these
governance structures and strategic actions. Below, I briefly clarify how some of
the fundamental premises of transaction cost economics have been overlooked in
the research of capital structure.

Transaction cost economics rests on two fundamental behavioral
assumptions: bounded rationality and opportunism (Williamson, 1985). Bounded
rationality (Simon, 1997) builds on the impact of uncertainty (Knight, 1964) to
study “human nature as we know it” (1964: 270). A combination of uncertainty
and cognitive limitations lead to human behavior that “is intendedly rational, but
only boundedly so” (Simon, 1997: 88). This boundedly rational behavior is
exacerbated by the need to protect actors in transactions against “each other’s
predatory propensities” (Knight, 1964: 254). These predatory propensities
manifest themselves as opportunism, a serious exchange hazard (Arrow, 1971;
Williamson, 1985). The nature of transactions (i.e., asset specificity, frequency
etc.) must “match” the attributes of the governance structures if costs arising from
such exchange hazards are to be economized.

Perhaps the first to indicate alternative governance structures as “choices”
for economic coordination was Coase. Within the governance structure of
markets, this coordination is carried out using the price mechanism (Coase, 1937).
Hierarchies coordinate economic activity using fiat (Williamson, 1991), with the
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business judgment rule creating a governance regime in which “hierarchy is its
own court of ultimate appeal” (1991: 274). In fact, “the distinguishing feature of
the firm is the supersession of the price mechanism” (Coase, 1937: 389).

Beyond markets and hierarchies, there exist a range of hybrid governance
structures such as subcontracting, quasi-integration and joint ventures (Ebers &
Oerlemans, 2014). These governance structures differentially deal with the
transaction costs arising from economic coordination. Some have argued that the
existence of hybrid governance structures suggests that a mix of attributes is
needed for economizing of transactions and mitigation of hazards (Hennart,
1993).
One key distinction separates governance structures that are organizational
and those that are embedded in the capital structure. Organizational governance
structures can take many forms. This plurality is itself a function of the
complexity facing economic organization. Hennart (1993) has argued that the
price system and hierarchy are the organizing methods that manifest as ideal types
in markets and firms respectively. The core reason for the plethora of hybrid
forms is that in reality, economic coordination requires a mix of attributes – i.e., a
combination of price system and hierarchy. These organizational governance
structures have been the focus of much research and debate (Ebers & Oerlemans,
2014).
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However, in this work, the focal governance structures are those
embedded in the capital structure (Williamson, 1987; Williamson, 1988). Unlike
organizational governance structures that arise from managerial choice about
economic coordination, the governance structures of equity and debt are vestiges
of firm financing choices. These financing choices lead to differential firm capital
structure and consequent associations with strategic actions (Bettis, 1983). In this
dissertation I focus on the strategic actions of innovation and diversification, two
of the most critical strategic actions carried out by firms (Hill & Snell, 1988) and
of continued interest to scholars of capital structure (O'Brien & David, 2014;
O'Brien et al., 2014).

I argue that since capital structure is a de facto governance structure, it is
necessary to have a simultaneous treatment of both equity and debt holder
heterogeneity to truly understand how the mix of these yin & yang of governance
structures are associated with strategic actions. This is in line with transaction cost
economics, in which a “fundamental tenet …is that the supply of a good or
service and its governance need be examined simultaneously” (Williamson, 1988:
567). Thus, selective focus on some providers of capital while assuming others
homogenous gives us only partial insight into the associations between capital
structure heterogeneity and strategic actions.

Unfortunately, extant capital structure research – even that which invokes
transaction cost arguments – circumvents the concurrent treatment of debt and
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equity heterogeneity. By keeping these two research streams separate, extant
research has left key questions unanswered: What is the association between
different kinds of governance structures embedded in equity and debt with
different forms of strategic actions? How do these varied governance structures
interact and relate to innovation and diversification? This dissertation research is
centered on answering these two questions. Below I briefly review some of the
popular categorizations of capital structure heterogeneity and demonstrate how
extant literature has left the above two critical questions unanswered.

Types of Debt holders
Most of the capital structure literature focuses on equity heterogeneity, i.e.
the ownership as governance literature (Daily et al., 2003b). However, debt
constitutes over 90 percent of all new external financing (Mayer, 1988). In
addition, a substantial proportion of large U.S. public firms utilize both relational
and transactional debt (Rauh & Sufi, 2010). Considering the governance attributes
of debt suggested by both agency theory and transaction cost economics –
governance of free cash flow in the former (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and
governance of resources in the latter (Williamson, 1987; Williamson, 1988) – the
debt homogeneity assumption (David et al., 2008) underlying almost all of
governance research is puzzling.

Extant literature categorizes different debt holders as either relational or
transactional (Boot, 2000). Relational debt refers to bank or commercial lending
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in which the lenders develop relationships with borrowers over repeated
interactions. Such relational lending is known to “facilitate monitoring and
screening and can overcome problems of asymmetric information” (2000: 7). In
other words, relational debt is fundamental to the mitigation of exchange hazards
such as uncertainty, opportunism and appropriation.

The mechanisms underlying such mitigation through relational debt may
be close coordination between the lender and borrower through board
representation (Stearns & Mizruchi, 1993). Another factor is network transitivity
(Uzzi & Gillespie, 2002) in which a focal firm gains resources and capabilities
from a particular network tie, this in turn increasing the value added it brings to a
relationship with a third independent network actor. In fact Uzzi and Gillespie
argue “bank – firm tie is the dominant explanatory factor for network transitivity
effects” (2002: 597).

An example of such transitivity is relational lenders introducing firms to
new suppliers. As such, relational debt characterized by embedded social relations
becomes an inimitable resource for firms and enhances their adaptability and
learning (Uzzi & Lancaster, 2003) in the face of incomplete contracting through
increased intertemporal information reusability (Greenbaum & Thakor, 2007).
Socially embedded relational debt is ideally suited for transfer of proprietary
knowledge since norms and expectations of trust and reciprocity, built over the
duration of a long-term relationship, provide assurances that such knowledge will
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be used for the mutual benefit of both parties in the transaction. A situation
ideally suited for strategic actions involving risks of uncertainty, opportunism and
appropriability.

In contrast to the hierarchical governance features of relational debt
outlined above, transactional debt (bonds) mirrors the rigid and unforgiving
governance structure of markets (Williamson, 1988). Doctrines enshrined in these
restrictive covenants both enforce and limit the scope of these governance
structures. This arms-length financing is focused on a single transaction with a
customer or multiple identical transactions with various customers. The rigidity of
such transactional debt is severe and even a single covenant violation can trigger
creditor intervention in management (Chava & Roberts, 2008). Thus,
transactional debt takes the form of an exceptionally constrictive governance
structure that limits managerial latitude with respect to strategic actions that may
require future adaptation.

Types of Equity holders
Unlike the scarce debt heterogeneity literature discussed above, there is a
rich literature on equity holder heterogeneity. One of the most common
categorizations is along the dimension of susceptibility to management pressure
(Brickley et al., 1988). Blockholders have a stronger incentive to vote than most
shareholders. Amongst these blockholders, Brickley et al. (1988) found, those less
beholden to management (pressure-resistant investors) such as pension and
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mutual funds are more likely to oppose management proposals. In contrast,
blockholders that derive benefits from managerial discretion (pressure-susceptible
investors) such as banks and insurance companies tend to vote in line with
management over critical corporate issues. Such institutions “have a virtually
unblemished history of passitivity” (Davis & Thompson, 1994: 162).

Susceptibility to management pressure has also been used to explain firm
innovation (Kochhar & David, 1996). Since these blockholders hold large
investments in firms, exiting their positions can be problematic. Kochhar and
David argue that such market illiquidity makes institutional investors more active
in making their voice heard by management, especially with regards to
investments in innovation that may confer long-term competitive advantage. Such
pressure-resistant investors are found to be positively associated with innovation
as measured by new product introductions.

However, Kocchar and David found no association between institutional
ownership in general and innovation. This may be a relic of their innovation
measure or the fact that the Brickley classification fails to take into account actual
institutional investment time horizons and instead depends on classification by
type of institution (Bushee, 1998). As pointed out by Bushee, classifying equity
holders on actual investment portfolio behavior (time horizons etc.) creates a
richer and more parsimonious categorization. This also ensures that investment
behavior is not assumed simply because of type of institution since equity holders
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“exhibit significant heterogeneity across these other possible classification
schemes” (1998: 310).

In spite of these shortcomings, the Brickley et al. (1988) categorization
remains popular and has also been used to investigate the association between
heterogeneity amongst equity holder groups and diversification (Ramaswamy et
al., 2002). In a modified2 application to the Indian context, Ramaswamy et al.
(2002) classified all for-profit institutional investors as pressure-resistant, while
banks and insurance companies were pressure-susceptible. They found that
pressure-resistant owners were negatively associated with unrelated
diversification

Using the same classification, a recent meta-analysis investigated the
ownership and firm performance linkage (Dalton et al., 2003). The authors
categorized outside equity-holders as: pressure-resistant (public pension funds,
mutual funds, foundations and endowments), pressure-sensitive (insurance
companies, banks and nonbank trusts) and pressure indeterminate (corporate
pension funds). Dalton et al. (2003) hypothesized that pressure-resistant investors
will be positively associated with firm financial performance. However, in their
meta-analysis, the results are non-supportive.

2

The Indian context precludes use of private pension funds as a separate category as most
pensions are managed by a federally operated scheme. See footnote 2 (Ramaswamy et al., 2002:
350).

63

I classify equity holders based on their past investment behavior (Bushee,
1998), into transient, quasi-indexer and dedicated. I extend transaction cost theory
and argue that transient equity holders provide governance structures akin to
markets while dedicated equity holders are more akin to hierarchies. This mirrors
the earlier classification of debt holders into transactional and dedicated (see
Table 5). My classification is in contrast to most of the capital structure research
focused on equity holder heterogeneity has used classification schemes based on
institutions by type; this is problematic (Bushee, 1998; Bushee, 2001; Connelly et
al., 2010b). Classification by type assumes stability in equity holder behavior and
preferences that is belied by empirical research (Bushee, 1999, 2001).

Transient equity holders are focused on short-term trading profits and are
characterized by high portfolio turnover and diversification (Bushee, 2001). If
disappointed by the financial performance of their holdings, these transient
investors do not hesitate to sell off the firm’s stock (Porter, 1992). The short-term
nature of these investors also suggests that they will forgo the rewards of longerterm and risker strategic actions that may entail poor short term performance3.

Dedicated and quasi-indexer equity holders provide more stable and longterm ownership to firms. However, due to their complete passitivity, I exclude
quasi-indexer from inclusion in my theoretical development. Dedicated investors
are akin to relational debt in that they have both long term and less diversified
3

Time horizon and risk have often been conflated in the literature. Both dimensions are developed
in the next section.
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portfolios (Bushee, 2001). Such owners have greater incentives to monitor
executives as well as gather proprietary firm-specific knowledge about long-term
and riskier strategic actions. Quasi-indexer equity holders on the other hand are
passive long-term investors with more diversified portfolios and as such have low
inclinations towards monitoring management. Porter (1992) has posited that the
prevalence of these quasi-indexers threatens long-term investments due to their
abdication of monitoring “duties”. In the next section, I extend the notion of
capital structure as governance structures and develop the dimensions of time
horizons and risk tolerance that underlie different groups of debt and equity
holders.
Dimensions Of Time Horizon And Risk Tolerance

Capital structure manifests the financing choices of a firm but represents
latent governance structures (Williamson, 1988). Extant research has taken for
granted the governance structures embedded in capital structure by separating
them into two research streams – debt and equity heterogeneity. This reveals an
implicit bias towards treating capital structure as merely financing choices, even
amongst researchers invoking transaction cost arguments. In this section I argue
that we may gain significant theoretical insights by combining these two distinct
research streams. Incorporation of both debt and equity heterogeneity as
governance structures allows this dissertation to be a first step in developing
commonalities between them and studying their interactions.
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The separation of the debt and equity heterogeneity literatures underplays
the transaction cost conception of capital structure as governance structures.
Transaction cost economics was a significant departure from neoclassical
economics because it treated the firm as a governance structure (Williamson,
1985), not a production function. The governance of transactions becomes the
focal objective, not the organizing of labor, capital and materials as a production
function. Once viewed from this perspective, capital itself is a governance
structure (Williamson, 1988) and not merely an input in the production function.

Williamson argued that debt mirrors the rule (Kydland & Prescott, 1977)
based governance of markets, while equity mirrors the discretion based
governance of hierarchies (see Table 5 above). I argue that these distinctions
extend to heterogeneity within debt and equity holder groups. Furthermore, I
propose that the fundamental dimensions underlying these groups are time
horizon and risk tolerance. These two dimensions allow me to treat different debt
and equity holders on an equal footing and hypothesize their associations with
strategic actions. Thus, I aim to gain fuller theoretical insights from a transaction
cost approach through a simultaneous investigation of governance structures,
irrespective of their manifest forms.

Strategic actions such as diversification and innovation involve significant
investments, firm resources and management attention. Furthermore, these
initiatives influence future firm performance. As such it is not surprising that
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capital structure research has provided us insights into the associations between
capital structure heterogeneity and diversification (Ngah-Kiing Lim et al., 2009;
Ramaswamy et al., 2002; Tihanyi et al., 2003) as well as innovation (David et al.,
2008; Hoskisson et al., 2002; Lee & O'Neill, 2003). However, this literature treats
capital as a production input by assuming either debt holder or equity holder
groups homogenous. Surprisingly this assumption is implicit even in research
invoking transaction cost arguments. In such cases, the focus is on attributes of
transactions (uncertainty and asset specificity) to the neglect of governance
structures embedded in firm capital structure. Since transaction costs arise due to
both transaction attributes and governance structure attributes, focus on just one
of these understates transaction costs reasoning (Williamson, 1985).
Opportunism and Governance Structures
The fundamental theoretical incompleteness created by the implicit
assumption discussed above is evident in the root metaphor at the beginning of
this work “…equity is a pillow, debt a sword…” Recognition of heterogeneity
within debt and equity holder groups was the first step in overcoming this
incompleteness; the insights generated by extant research reflect these positive
developments. As a next step, I elaborate on the governance structures latent in
these diverse debt holder and equity holder groups and posit that the underlying
dimensions of time horizon and risk tolerance are common to both the “Yin and
Yang” of firm capital structure. These governance structures map onto particular
forms of opportunism that are often conflated in the literature. This extends
transaction cost reasoning and contributes to overcoming one of its key
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weaknesses – especially in the context of capital structure investigations –
namely, that it has “given disproportionate attention to the abstract description of
transactions as compared with the abstract description of governance”
(Williamson, 1991: 270).

Within the framework of transaction cost economics, “the object is not
merely to resolve conflict in progress but also to recognize potential conflict in
advance and devise governance structures that forestall or attenuate it”
(Williamson, 1985: 29). These conflicts are an inevitable outcome of behavioral
factors like bounded rationality and opportunism leading to incomplete
contracting and contractual hazards. These problems are exacerbated when they
merge with characteristics of transactions such as asset specificity. But the capital
structure literature has primarily focused on transaction attributes such as asset
specificity. Thus, the critical importance of the governance structures embedded
in firm capital structure remains underappreciated. We still do not have a
comprehensive view of exactly how attributes of governance structures differ
amongst dissimilar capital structure groups and their interactions. Further, what
are the common underlying dimensions across these diverse governance
structures and how are they related to mitigating opportunism (Williamson,
1993)?
Opportunism is “self-seeking with guile” (Williamson, 1985: 47) or
simply, the opposite of trust (Barney & Hansen, 1994). The behavioral
assumption of opportunism has received trenchant criticism (Ghoshal & Moran,
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1996) and has been labeled “neo-Hobbesian” (Granovetter, 1985) for taking a
needlessly dark view of human nature. Unfortunately reality doesn’t correspond
to the utopia envisioned by such critics. Reality suggests that “but for
opportunism, most forms of complex contracting and hierarchy vanish”
(Williamson, 1993: 97). If opportunism were wished away, market governance
would predominate since the key factor for market failure disappears. It therefore
becomes important to understand how different forms of opportunism are related
to diverse governance structures.

Opportunism comes in many varieties (Alchian & Woodward, 1988;
Williamson, 1993). Unfortunately, much of transaction cost theorizing and
empirical testing ignores these differences (Alchian & Woodward, 1988; Tsang,
2006). Perhaps this assumption of opportunism homogeneity is also an artifact of
the relative neglect of governance structures in the capital structure literature
invoking transaction cost arguments. These distinctions are important although
underdeveloped. This in spite that fact that “differential contractual hazards that
are associated with alternative forms of governance” (Williamson, 1993: 104).

Some types of opportunism are adverse selection, moral hazard, holdup
and appropriability hazard. The first of these, adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970) is
an ex ante form of opportunism, while the latter three are ex post and more
germane to this study. Moral hazard (Hölmstrom, 1979) refers to an incomplete
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contracting problem that arises from information asymmetries between principals
and agents. Monitoring is the preferred containment device for moral hazard.

Holdup (Klein, 1996; Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978) refers to the
threat of appropriable specialized quasi rents arising from asset specificity.
Holdup hazards are most often dealt with by shifting transactions within a
hierarchy and remain one of the most common justifications for the existence of
hierarchical governance structures. In fact, asset specificity (i.e., cause of holdup
hazard) is the most common construct incorporated in transaction cost
investigations (David & Han, 2004). This focus on asset specificity is reminiscent
of arguments made earlier about the relative focus on transaction attributes to the
detriment of explicating governance structures.

Appropriability hazards (Oxley, 1997) are provoked by weak property
rights, usually in the context of technology and knowledge transfer.
Appropriability remains a key driver of innovation centric transactions being
subsumed in hierarchical governance structures. Fundamentally, I argue that
holdup and appropriability hazard plague market governance; while, moral hazard
hampers hierarchical governance (see Table 6 below). This distinction remains
underappreciated in the capital structure literature. However, it is germane to this
research since governance structures differentially deal with opportunism hazards.
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The fundamental attributes of all governance structures are ownership
autonomy, incentive intensity, administrative controls and adaptation (Ebers &
Oerlemans, 2014; Williamson, 1985; Williamson, 1991). Nonetheless, these four
attributes can be further unpacked into other features of governance structures that
constrain or enable strategic actions (see Table 6). These additional features of
governance structures are especially relevant in the context of capital structures
because they indicate the economic institution (i.e., markets or hierarchies) that
these disparate groups of debt and equity holders resemble. I argue that
transactional debt and transient equity (i.e., impatient capital) are akin to market
governance, while relational debt and dedicated equity (i.e., patient capital) are
akin to hierarchical governance. Extant literature, by bifurcating debt and equity
heterogeneity research has overlooked the governance similarities across debt and
equity holder groups.

In addition, I argue that the dimensions of time horizon and risk tolerance
are fundamental to debt and equity holder groups and determine their sorting into
governance structures akin to markets or hierarchies. What lies beneath these
disparate groups are their differences in preferences that can be bifurcated along
time and risk. These dimensions are either restrained or enabled by the attributes
of governance structures.

For example, relational debt is long-term in nature and may, in some
cases, even involve the presence of bankers on board (Stearns & Mizruchi, 1993).
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These relationships not only affect the type of financing but also the nature of
governance. Firms with embedded social ties to bankers often get favorable loan
conditions (Uzzi, 1999) and avoid late-payment penalties (Uzzi & Gillespie,
2002). Such discretionary regimes (Boot, Greenbaum, & Thakor, 1993) are
supported by exchange of proprietary information (David et al., 2008) over long
periods of time (Boot, 2000), thus potentially supporting riskier strategic actions.
Therefore, relational debt, ceteris paribus, has features of hierarchical governance.

Long-term institutional investors, i.e. dedicated equity, help counter an
excessive focus on short-term earnings at the expense of longer term strategic
actions (Bushee, 1998). Such dedicated investors (attributed by Porter 1992 to
countries like Germany and Japan) are more invested in monitoring management
through devices like outside board members (Schnatterly & Johnson, 2014). Thus,
due to their propensity to provide hierarchical governance, dedicated equity
holders are more associated with long-term strategic actions, which may also
entail risk. This assertion is supported by the literatures categorizing equity
holders by type (Hoskisson et al., 2002) as well as by actual behavior (Bushee,
2001).

Transactional debt is fundamentally arms length and covenant driven. The
dispersed nature of bonds and lack of proprietary information about the firm make
them susceptible to the exchange hazards of uncertainty and asset specificity in
the context of both innovation (David et al., 2008; Wang & Thornhill, 2010) and
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diversification (O'Brien et al., 2014). In fact, most of the capital structure
literature, by assuming debt homogeneity, has focused on such market governance
provided by transactional debt. This situation underscores the theoretical
incompleteness in the literature addressing debt heterogeneity. This assumption of
homogeneity drives researchers to focus on the specific elements of transactions
(usually uncertainty and asset specificity) and neglect governance structures
rooted in capital structure.

Short-term equity holders have long been criticized as the enablers of
managerial myopia (Porter, 1992) by focusing excessively on short-term earnings
(Bushee, 2001). Such transient equity neglect their monitoring function to such an
extent that their presence in the capital structure has been associated with
financial misreporting by firms (Burns, Kedia, & Lipson, 2010). Such findings
contradict the assumption of equity homogeneity in the debt heterogeneity
literature that ascribes hierarchical governance to all equity. I therefore argue that,
similar to transactional debt, transient equity is generally akin to market
governance (cf. O’Brien et al. 2014).

Thus, extending the transaction cost logic to within debt and equity holder
groups, I posit that the original claim (Williamson, 1988) of debt offering market
and equity offering hierarchical governance is an oversimplification. On
investigating the empirical and theoretical developments in the last couple of
decades, it is clear that reality is more nuanced. Relational debt exhibits elements
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of hierarchical governance such as close monitoring (Mizruchi & Stearns, 1994b;
Stearns & Mizruchi, 1993), forbearance in the event of debt covenant violation
(Chava & Roberts, 2008), exchange of non-public proprietary information
between the lender and borrower (Demiroglu & James, 2010; Uzzi & Lancaster,
2003) etc.

Concurrently, transient equity generally exhibits features of market
governance (see Table 6 above) that have been overlooked in the literature. The
focus of transient equity investors on short-term firm earnings (Bushee, 2001) is
largely driven by their own incentives being tied to quarterly fund performance
(Hoskisson et al., 2002). There is high level of competition between these fast
moving equity investors to gain funds under management by demonstrating shortterm portfolio gains (Graves & Waddock, 1990; Porter, 1992). When viewed as
governance structures, such transient equity exhibits features of stark market
governance in which firms are penalized (through sell-offs, portfolio turnover
being a key feature of transient equity) for underperforming.

Applying a comprehensive transaction cost perspective – i.e. incorporating
both governance structure arguments and transaction/exchange hazards – I argue
that the underlying dimensions of time horizon and risk tolerance transcend the
conventional bifurcation of debt and equity holders and necessitate their
simultaneous treatment. The full categorization is depicted in Table 7. Quadrant 1
in Table 7 represents impatient capital with low risk tolerance and short-time
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horizons, such impatient capital constituted transactional debt and transient
equity. Quadrant 3 in Table 7 represents patient capital with high-risk tolerance
and long-time horizons; such patient capital is constituted by relational debt and
dedicated equity.

Quadrant 2 contains debt and equity holders who combine high-risk
tolerance with short-time horizons. Such debt or equity holders can best be
characterized as activist, they often seek corporate control to bring about
management and/or strategic change (Harner, 2011). Quadrant 4 in Table 7
represents owner-managed or family firms that tend to have long-time horizons
and general focus on preserving socioeconomic wealth (Gómez-Mejía, Haynes,
Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007). The scope of this
dissertation precludes discussion of these latter two categories of capital structure
constituents. The next section develops specific hypotheses on patient and
impatient capital.
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Capital Structure Heterogeneity And Diversification

The diversification strategy of a firm invariably shuffles its resource
bundle, either making it more (related diversification) or less (unrelated
diversification) firm specific. Firms with a well developed stock of intangible
resources often try to leverage them over multiple related businesses (Chatterjee
& Wernerfelt, 1991). However, the very intangibility, firm specificity and
internalization of these resources reduces firms debt (transactional) capacity
(Vicente-Lorente, 2001). The reduced debt capacity is not surprising since
transaction cost arguments suggest that increased asset specificity would
negatively influence the ability of debt holders to redeploy assets in the case of
financial distress. Thus, from the perspective of debt-holders, related
diversification is a high-risk endeavor that increases asset specificity and reduces
liquidation values. Unrelated diversification is the opposite.

Concomitantly, short-term equity investors have a greater focus on shortterm firm performance. Prior research suggests that “pressure-resistant” investors
are negatively associated with unrelated diversification (Ramaswamy et al.,
2002). However, as mentioned earlier, such research conflates multiple
institutional owners (pension, mutual and investment funds) into one category in
addition to ignoring their actual investment styles (Bushee, 2001). I posit that
these different owners will have a differential association with firm diversification
strategy due to their varied risk and time horizons.
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From a firm strategy perspective, related diversification allows firms to
leverage existing assets to generate competitive advantage which often confers
immediate stock price gains (Tihanyi et al., 2003) that are attractive to investors
seeking high returns over short time horizons. However, fuller application of the
transaction cost lens suggests that the governance structures provided by equity
holder groups are also germane. The predominance of market governance
provided by transient equity holders should ideally put a pause to strategies
dependent on unrelated diversification due to their generally higher risk and
payoff time horizons (Palich et al., 2000) from the firm perspective.

Unfortunately, research also indicates that short-term institutional
investors, characterized by diversified portfolios and high turnover, are likely to
neglect their monitoring duties (Dharwadkar, Goranova, Brandes, & Khan, 2008;
Schnatterly & Johnson, 2014). I posit that transient equity holders due to these
factors are likely to allow unrelated diversification to go on unchecked. Thus, the
impact of impatient capital (transactional debt and transient equity) on
diversification is the same.

Hypothesis 1a: Transactional debt is positively associated with unrelated
diversification.
Hypothesis 1b: Transient equity is positively associated with unrelated
diversification.
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An unintended consequence of the market-like, rules driven regime of
impatient capital is lack of investments in capabilities and long-term competitive
advantage (Porter, 1992) that accrue from related diversification. This suggests:

Hypothesis 1c: Transient equity is negatively associated with related
diversification.
The long-term nature of relational debt necessitates private knowledge
accumulation about the borrower by the lender, in effect “specialization leads to
more efficient credit analysis and the development of better monitoring
techniques because of cross-sectional and intertemporal information reusability”
(Greenbaum & Thakor, 2007: 531). The long-term performance of both the
borrower and lender are closely tied together, a connection that is further
enhanced by cross selling of other financial products by the relational lender.

Fundamentally, relational lending confers four distinct benefits (Boot,
2000): One, it manifests as hierarchical governance by adopting a discretionary
regime. Two, due to the long-term nature of the relationship, relational debt
allows lenders to permit strategies that pay off over the long term. Three, the loan
covenants themselves can be extensive as they are informed by intimate
knowledge of firm strategy and capabilities. Four, relationship lending may
involve collateral that requires close monitoring (2000:13). The first two of these
push the firm to obtain higher levels of diversification. However, the latter two
put a break on unsustainable unrelated diversification.
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Dedicated equity is in an especially precarious position, being residual
claimants with a low diversified portfolio. I posit that their attention to
diversification is triggered when it is excessively high and runs the risk of
impairing firm performance (Palich et al., 2000) and increasing their portfolio
risk. This is a concern since leveraging of firm resources to garner high
performance is enabled by related diversification and hampered by unrelated
diversification (Palich et al., 2000). Thus, patient capital is likely to support
related diversification even though it develops firm specific assets and
capabilities; and dedicated equity (being residual claimants) is likely to
discourage unrelated diversification.

Hypothesis 2a: Relational debt has a positive association with related
diversification.
Hypothesis 2b: Dedicated equity has a positive association with related
diversification.
Hypothesis 2c: Dedicated equity has a negative association with unrelated
diversification.
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Capital Structure Heterogeneity And Innovation

Innovation is one of the lynchpins of competitive advantage as it generates
firm specific assets, learning and capabilities (Zott, 2003). But, according to
extant literature these very attributes of innovation expose firms to information
asymmetries and exchange hazards (Balakrishnan & Fox, 1993; David et al.,
2008; O'Brien, 2003; Vicente-Lorente, 2001). Although valid, this perspective
only gives us partial insight into the ability of transaction cost arguments to
explain the linkages between capital structure heterogeneity and innovation.
Another element of the transaction cost argument are the governance structures
embedded in capital structure.

The classical agency function of debt is represented by transactional debt
which curtails discretionary managerial spending by tying up free cash flow
(Jensen, 1986; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The restrictive covenants and interest
payments of this market regime siphon away capital from internal investments in
R & D. This directly implicates transactional debt as a restraint on innovation
through firm R & D spending (Long & Ravenscraft, 1993). This phenomena is
distinct from the positive impact of relational debt on R & D spending due to
reduced exchange hazards (David et al., 2008).

Combining governance structure arguments with transaction attributes
gives us a richer picture of the association between capital structure heterogeneity
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and strategic actions like innovation. Innovation has long been considered to
entail uncertain and long-term payoffs (Hill & Snell, 1988). By focusing primarily
on transaction attributes, i.e. uncertainty and asset specificity, extant transaction
cost explanations have underplayed the latter, i.e. governance structure attributes.
Market-like governance structures (i.e., transactional debt and transient equity)
are impatient and therefore mismatched for the long-term time horizons that
innovation requires. Concurrently, hierarchical governance structures enable longterm capability development through investments in intangibles such as R & D.

However, impatient capital is driven by short-term market performance of
firms. On occasion, innovation may spur such short-term performance. Such a
situation emerges in the case of acquisitions. Mergers and acquisitions are high
risk endeavors (King, Dalton, Daily, & Covin, 2004) with highly variable
performance implications. However, in the context of externally acquired
innovations, they confer unique advantages (Ahuja & Katila, 2001) such as
enhanced absorptive capacity to internalize and exploit external knowledge
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Todorova & Durisin, 2007), faster market entry
(Berger, Bonime, Goldberg, & White, 2004), new opportunities for
recombinations (Henderson & Clark, 1990; Kogut & Zander, 1992) etc.. Such
advantages via externally acquired innovation are likely to speed firm
performance by helping them overcome time compression diseconomies
(Dierickx & Cool, 1989) – making it attractive to transient equity holders.
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Another significant factor that makes such external innovation attractive to
impatient capital is the reduced information asymmetry. Research suggests that
more forthcoming disclosures by acquiring companies are associated with higher
firm performance (Shalev, 2009). When viewed as market-like governance
structures, transient equity holders are at a disadvantage compared to hierarchical
governance structures such as dedicated equity and relational debt. There is a lack
of proprietary information exchange between firms and their transient equity
holders and transactional debt holders. External innovation, due to disclosure
requirements, offers such market-like governance structures an opportunity to
mitigate the risk that innovation carries. I posit that due to these factors, impatient
capital has a very different view of externally acquired innovation as compared to
internal innovation via R & D spending. Thus:

Hypothesis 4a: Transactional debt is positively associated with external
innovation.
Hypothesis 4b: Transient equity is positively associated with external
innovation.
Research also suggests that transient equity holders are intrinsically
against innovation due to the required immediate expensing of R & D (i.e.
internal innovation) costs (Bushee, 1998) that dampens short-term firm
performance. Poor performing portfolios negatively impact the incentives of these
fund managers who are judged primarily on short-term performance. This leads
them to discount the long term gains that accrue from investing in intangibles like
research and development (Hoskisson et al., 2002). Thus, I hypothesize:
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Hypothesis 4c: Transient equity is negatively associated with internal
innovation.

Relational debt is fundamentally a hierarchical governance structure.
Relational lenders combine close monitoring, occasionally through board
representation (Stearns & Mizruchi, 1993), with a discretionary approach to
covenant enforcement (Uzzi & Gillespie, 2002). These long-term lenders are
often trusted with proprietary firm-level information that mitigates information
asymmetries between lender and borrower. Such factors suggest a positive
association between relational debt and firm innovation through R & D
investments.

Hypothesis 5a: Relational debt has a positive association with internal
innovation.

Dedicated equity holders are interested in the long-term performance of
the firm and are willing provide latitude to managers by “forgiving their sins” in
the pursuit of innovation based strategies that are critical for competitive
advantage (Porter, 1992). An example of such patient capital are the domestic
owners of Japanese firms who take a long-term, communitarian view (O'Brien &
David, 2014) and support innovation (Lee & O'Neill, 2003).
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Hypothesis 5b: Dedicated equity has a positive association with
innovation.

Such dedicated equity holders are also likely to be concerned by the
uncertainty of merger and acquisition success, since research suggests
“anticipated acquisition synergies are not realized by acquiring firms” (King et
al., 2004: 194). Externally acquired innovation is further complicated by the
importance of factors like technological overlap (Sears & Hoetker, 2013) and
relatedness of knowledge base, which has a curvilinear impact on subsequent
innovation output (Ahuja & Katila, 2001). This suggests that external innovation
that at face value appears impressive to impatient capital may not be easy to
integrate post-acquisition (Zollo & Singh, 2004). Therefore, I posit that dedicated
equity holders will have a more circumspect attitude to externally acquired
innovations.

Hypothesis 5c: Dedicated equity has a negative association with external
innovation.
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The Mediating Role Of Executive Compensation: Mitigating Risk Aversion
Or Aggravating Loss Aversion?

“Parties engaged in a trade that is supported by nontrivial investments in
transaction-specific assets are effectively operating in a bilateral trading
relation with one another. Harmonizing the contractual interface that joins
the parties, thereby to effect adaptability and promote continuity, becomes
the source of real economic value.”
-

Williamson (1985: 30)

Agency theory has been the predominant means of investigating ex ante
incentive alignment between principals and agents. This is not surprising since
fundamentally, all contracting contains elements of agency (Ross, 1973). This
tradition has a long history and intellectual roots in mathematical “mechanism
design” research (Myerson, 1983) and positivist agency (Jensen, 1983), the two
key subsets of agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989).

Transaction cost economics acknowledges the importance of incentive
mechanisms but differs from these ex ante incentive design traditions due to its
focus on the governance of ex post contractual relations (Williamson, 1985).
Transaction cost economics is therefore complementary to positivist agency
theory with its focus on “governance mechanisms that limit the agent’s selfserving behavior” (Eisenhardt, 1989: 59), i.e. opportunism. In the context of this
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current study, I therefore propose that the associations between the governance
structures within debt and equity and strategic actions are mediated by executive
compensation. Theory suggests that holdup due to asset specificity plagues
markets and incentives may relieve these problems.

Also, positive agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989) assumes that managers
are risk averse while owners are risk neutral or seeking. This fundamental
asymmetry can be overcome using optimal contracting that better aligns managers
with firm owners. Compensation becomes a key alignment device within the
agency framework. For example, stock options have been found to encourage
managerial risk taking through increased investment outlays (Sanders &
Hambrick, 2007) and corporate risk taking (Wright, Kroll, Krug, & Pettus, 2006).
This suggests that the combination of reduced monitoring by impatient capital and
increased incentives will fuel unrelated diversification and external acquisitions.
Therefore, based on agency arguments that executive compensation mitigates risk
aversion, I hypothesize:

Hypothesis 7a: CEO stock options will positively (and partially) mediate
the association between transactional debt and unrelated diversification.
Hypothesis 7b: CEO stock options will positively (and partially) mediate
the association between transient equity and unrelated diversification.
Hypothesis 7c: CEO stock options will positively (and partially) mediate
the association between transactional debt and external innovation.
Hypothesis 7d: CEO stock options will positively (and partially) mediate
the association between transient equity and external innovation.
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However, in direct contrast to agency theory, behavioral-agency
(Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998) proposes that agents are primarily loss averse
and not risk averse. Thus, “stock option schemes may increase risk bearing of the
executive (and, thus, increase risk aversion) rather than decrease risk aversion”
(1998: 141). This suggests opposing hypotheses to the ones above since CEO
stock options may have unintended consequences by aggravation of loss aversion.

Hypothesis 8a: CEO stock options will negatively (and partially) mediate
the association between transactional debt and unrelated diversification.
Hypothesis 8b: CEO stock options will negatively (and partially) mediate
the association between transient equity and unrelated diversification.
Hypothesis 8c: CEO stock options will negatively (and partially) mediate
the association between transactional debt and external innovation.
Hypothesis 8d: CEO stock options will negatively (and partially) mediate
the association between transient equity and external innovation.
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The Mediating Role Of The Board Of Directors: Mitigating Moral Hazard

“It has long been recognized that a problem of moral hazard may arise
when individuals engage in risk sharing under conditions such that their
privately taken actions affect the probability distribution of the outcome.”
- Holmstrom (1979: 74)

Hierarchies are an efficient way to deal with holdup problems, triggered
by asset specificity, that are endemic in markets. However, the discretionary
regime within hierarchies engenders moral hazards due to information
asymmetries. This trade-off is a choice between Scylla and Charybdis. Viewed
from a transaction cost lens (Williamson, 1985), providers of long term capital are
at a unique disadvantage. Unlike consumers, labor and suppliers, the firm’s equity
holders invest for the life of the firms and are residual claimants. These equity
holders are the only voluntary stakeholders in the firm whose contracts are not
renewed/ renegotiated regularly. Even debt holders occasionally have
opportunities to renegotiate terms.

Another issue further exacerbating this contractual impasse for equity
holders is the fact that “their investments are not associated with particular
assets…the diffuse nature of their investments puts shareholders at an enormous
disadvantage in crafting…bilateral safeguards” (Williamson, 1985: 305). It is to
safeguard against this risk of opportunism that the fiduciary role of the board of
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directors arose (Alchian & Woodward, 1988; Williamson, 1985). Although it has
been argued that concentrated equity holders may offer a substitute to board
governance (Desender et al., 2013). Research also suggests that relational
governance and contractual/ fiduciary arrangements are complementary (Poppo &
Zenger, 2002).

At this juncture, it is important to point out an important distinction.
Unlike the focus on equity holder representation in much of the board of
directors’ literature, the transaction cost perspective (Williamson, 1985) explicitly
notes the possibility that other constituencies of the firm may have impact on its
management via the board of directors. Similar to long-term equity holders (i.e.,
dedicated equity), long term lenders “usually carefully align incentives and
protect themselves with safeguards” (1985: 307) that may involve board
representation (Stearns & Mizruchi, 1993).

I argue that these providers of patient capital (dedicated equity and
relational debt), due to their unique position are especially exposed to a particular
type of opportunism: moral hazard. Moral hazard is fundamentally driven by
information asymmetries between two parties in a transaction. It “arises in
agreements in which at least one party relies on the behavior of another and
information about that behavior is costly” (Alchian & Woodward, 1988: 68). This
is distinct from the holdup problem (due to asset specificity) that has been the
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primary focus of most capital structure research invoking transaction cost
arguments.

Such information asymmetries are endemic in the context of strategic
actions that have long-term payoffs. Information asymmetries suggest that the
alignment between hierarchical governance structures in the capital structure and
strategic actions takes place partially through intermediaries who specialize in
mitigating moral hazard. I argue that these intermediaries are the board of
directors.

The role and contribution of outside members in the board of directors to
corporate governance has been controversial and research has questioned their
utility (Bhagat & Black, 2001). Five possibilities arise when we question the
value and contribution of these independent directors: One, perhaps director
independence is a mirage that is propped up by titles but belied by social ties
(Cohen, Frazzini, & Malloy, 2012; Hwang & Kim, 2009). Second, resource
dependence suggests that directors are valuable to the extent they can channel
resources to a firm (Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000), thus independence and
monitoring may be overshadowed by their resource provision role. Third, perhaps
the conduit for monitoring by outside directors is committee membership
(especially audit and compensation). Thus, operationalization of outside directors
that ignores committee membership is insufficient. Fourth, contingencies like past
performance and CEO power may influence the monitoring attention of the board
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(Tuggle, Sirmon, Reutzel, & Bierman, 2010). Fifth, independent directors need to
be better incentivized to align their interests with those of the equity holders.

It is the last of these, director incentives, which I focus on since research
indicates that in the context of strategic actions entailing risk, director
compensation is a key factor. In the case of acquisitions, the relationship between
outside director compensation and acquisition rate is curvilinear (inverted-U)
(Deutsch, Keil, & Laamanen, 2007) suggesting that the ability of incentives to
reduce risk aversion tapers off. Deutsch et al. (2007) label this effect “dualagency” since it implies that compensation of both executives and board members
matters.

The fundamental agency problem between managers and providers of long
term capital is rooted in their differential risk preferences (Eisenhardt, 1989;
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Managers, due to employment risk, tend to be riskaverse while equity-holders might be risk-neutral or risk-seeking. The monitoring
function of the board is meant to mitigate this agency problem. In the context of
strategic actions such as innovation or diversification, focus has traditionally been
on “outsider” or “independence” leading to equivocal findings (Deutsch, 2005).
Stock options ostensibly provide directors with the pecuniary incentives to carry
out this monitoring and low absolute levels of director incentives have been found
to be negatively associated with R & D (Deutsch, 2005). This suggests that
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director incentives influence their monitoring performance in the context of
strategic actions. Thus, I hypothesize:

Hypothesis 9a: Director incentives positively mediate the association
between relational debt and related diversification.
Hypothesis 9b: Director incentives positively mediate the association
between dedicated equity and related diversification.
Hypothesis 9c: Director incentives positively mediate the association
between relational debt and innovation.
Hypothesis 9d: Director incentives positively mediate the association
between dedicated equity and innovation.

Figure 1 depicts the full model of hypothesized relationships in the context of
diversification.
Figure 2 depicts the full model of hypothesized relationships in the context of
innovation.
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CHAPTER 4
METHODS
Sample
My base sample includes all firms with data available on equity
heterogeneity (Bushee classification), and company financials (Compustat
Annual). Considering that my study incorporates multiple dependent variables –
using a single sample would create selection bias. In order to sidestep this I
created three separate samples. One dataset each to investigate firm
diversification, M & A (Mergers and Acquisitions) and R & D (Research and
Development). The first dataset combines the base sample described above with
firm diversification data from Compustat Business Segments and includes of
5,025 firm-year observations. The second dataset is a combination of the base
sample and M & A data from SDC Platinum and comprises of 2,790 firm-year
observations. The third and final dataset combines the base sample with R & D
data from Compustat and has 12,161 firm-year observations.

All three datasets are of public U.S. firms from 1996 – 2010 in the form of
unbalanced panels. To each of these three datasets I added CEO and Director
options data from ExecuComp as well as debt data from Osiris. Lack of pre-1996
data in ExecuComp and limited bank loan data available from Osiris (data item
21070) were the main constraints on the sample. The unbalanced nature of the
panel combined with the use of Generalized Method of Moments (GMM,
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described in Analysis section below) regression reduced the usable sample to
firms with multi-year data available. Below I describe the construction of this
sample.

The use of multiple datasets in a study of this nature means that the final
usable samples are obtained after significant data loss. The initial sample of
equityholder classification and Compustat annual data (Bushee data combined
with Thompson Reuters 13f and Compustat annual data) comprised 35,705 firmyear observations. This initial dataset encompassed the S & P 1500 universe of
firm that is the focus of the publicly available Bushee classification. (Bushee,
2013). In order to prevent data loss at the merging stage, full merging option was
carried out in R (data replication code is provided in Appendix).

Reduction in usable samples in studies incorporating multiple datasets is
common, especially in studies incorporating executive option data. For example,
another study (Lim & McCann, 2013), published in the Strategic Management
Journal, incorporating director options had a final usable sample of 2,004 firms.
The inclusion of debt heterogeneity in a sample of U.S. firms is a significant
challenge since such data “is not readily available for U.S. firms” (O’Brien et.al.
2014: 1021). To overcome this, I utilized Osiris bank loan data. Osiris is a
credible data source, that is increasingly being used in studies published in top
journals like the Academy of Management Journal (Rogan, 2014; Surroca, Tribó,
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& Zahra, 2013). Since this is the first study of its kind – incorporating both equity
and debt heterogeneity – the datasets required to conduct it are also unique.

The importance of the equity classification (Bushee, 1998; Bushee, 2001;
Connelly et al., 2010b) used in this study cannot be overstated. The literature has
for long suggested (Graves, 1988; O'Brien et al., 2014; Porter, 1992) that capital
providers are differentially associated with strategic actions due to their varying
time horizons. However, scholars have assumed these investment time horizons to
be linked with institution type. For example, pension fund providers have long
term horizons, while mutual funds exhibit short-term horizons (Hoskisson et al.,
2002). However, classifications based on actual equityholder behavior – rather
than assumed behavior – are likely to provide richer opportunities to disentangle
the complex relationships between risk bearers (capital structure) and risk takers
(management).

Therefore, I utilize the Bushee classification that divides equityholders as
transient, dedicated or quasi-indexer based on their past investment patterns in the
areas of portfolio turnover and portfolio diversification (Bushee, 1998).
Specifically, Bushee used factor and cluster analysis of nine variables that
describe institutional investor behavior: level of portfolio concentration (average
percentage of an institutions ownership position in portfolio firms), average
percentage holding, percentage of institutions equity that is invested in firms
where institution has greater than 5 percent ownership, a Herfindahl measure of
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concentration (squared percentage ownership in each portfolio firm), portfolio
turnover, stability of holdings (percentage of holdings held for over two years). In
addition to these six variables, Bushee includes three measures of institutions
sensitivity to firm earnings (1998: 324).

The superiority of this classification is evident from the fact that Bushee
found significant heterogeneity by type across these equityholder categories, i.e.
simple type-based classifications do not capture the real time horizon (and risk
preferences, as argued in chapter 3) heterogeneity observed amongst
equityholders (1998: 310). This data is at the institution (ID mgrno, i.e. Manager
Number) level with multiple institutions holding equity positions (obtained from
Thompson-Reuters 13f data) in any given sample firm. Following standard
practice in the literature (Connelly et al., 2010b), I create a separate dataset which
incorporated the last known holdings for each manager and firm combination for
each year. This dataset was used to calculate the final aggregate shareholdings of
Transient and Dedicated equityholders for each sample firm-year. This firm-year
data combined with the Compustat annual fiscal year forms the base sample from
which the three datasets in this study were created.

The descriptive statistics for the three samples are provided in Tables 8a
(Diversification), 8b (M & A) and 8c (R & D).
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Variables

Independent variables. Equity heterogeneity studies have usually been
carried out using type based classification schemes for investors that
overestimates their stability and ignores actual investor behavior (Bushee, 1998;
Bushee, 2001). Use of the Bushee classification scheme allows me to bypass this
common weakness of extant studies, i.e. assumption of stable time horizons
amongst institutional investors. This classification scheme extends between 1981
and 2010 for institutional investors in (largely) the S & P 1500 companies. The
classification trifurcates investors into transient, dedicated and quasi-investors
based on investment horizons and portfolio turnover. As described above, I
merged Bushee’s publicly available classification scheme with ThompsonReuters 13f data to identify actual ownership stakes of these different types of
equity holders in the sample firms.

Following established methodology (Connelly et al., 2010b) , I calculated
aggregate equityholdings (as percentage of shares outstanding) for each type of
investor at the firm level. For the purposes of this study, I incorporate only the
transient and dedicated equity holders since by definition quasi-indexers are
passive investors. This gives me a dataset that captures actual equity holder
behavior that mirrors market or hierarchical governance rather than classification
by type of institution. The variable for both transient and dedicated equity holders
is their percentage shareholding of total firm outstanding shares.
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Debt heterogeneity data comprises of transactional and relational debt
obtained through Compustat annual dataset (Wang & Thornhill, 2010) and Osiris.
Relational debt is the bank loan (Data item 21070) information available through
the Osiris dataset. Transactional debt is primarily corporate bonds and includes
notes, debentures and subordinates. Fundamentally, transactional debt is the debt
remaining that is not classified as relational (Boot, 2000; Wang & Thornhill,
2010). This leads to high correlation between relational and transactional debt, but
that is not a concern for this study since none of the hypothesized models
incorporate both together. The debtholder variables were calculated using
standard practice in the literature (Vicente-Lorente, 2001; Wang & Thornhill,
2010) and are their ratios to the sum of book value of equity (Compustat variables
book value per share BKLVPS multiplied by shares outstanding CSHO) and longterm debt (Compustat variable DLTT).

Dependent variables. The strategic action of innovation is bifurcated into
internal and external to reflect their differing risks and time horizons. Internal
innovation is measured using firm R & D intensity (Hoskisson et al., 2002).
Following prior capital structure research (Balakrishnan & Fox, 1993; Wang &
Thornhill, 2010), I calculated R & D intensity as the ratio of R & D expenditures
to net sales.

External innovation refers to focal firms acquiring innovations developed
outside through mergers and acquisitions. I follow the same methodology as
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developed in prior research on external innovation (Puranam, Singh, & Zollo,
2006; Sears & Hoetker, 2013) which identifies acquisitions using the SDC
Platinum M & A database. Following established practice, first I calculated the
aggregate value of completed M & A by each firm in the sample. The ratio of this
aggregate completed M & A value to assets is the dependent variable.

The theory developed in this dissertation predicts that heterogeneous
groups of equity and debt-holders have different time horizons and risk tolerance.
Prior research has either assumed homogeneity of innovation strategies (i.e.,
focused solely on internal innovation – R & D expenses) or focused on either debt
or equity heterogeneity. In this dissertation, I extend the literature by combing
both internal and external innovation and investigating their association with
capital structure heterogeneity that encompasses both equity and debt-holders.

For diversification, I calculated the well-established entropy measure
(Davis & Duhaime, 1989; Jacquemin & Berry, 1979; Palepu, 1985) using the
Compustat Business Segments database for the sample firms. This measure takes
into account two elements: first, the number of SIC segments in which a firm
operates and second, the relative importance of each SIC segments to total firm
sales. In addition it also takes into account the relatedness of segments. Following
established methodology (Palepu, 1985: 252 and Davis & Duhaime, 1989: 11) I
first calculated firm sales in each industry group (SIC two digit level) and
industry segment (SIC four digit level). Unrelated diversification is the weighted
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average of all firm industry group shares that arises out of operating in several
industry groups. If Pj is the share of jth group sales in total sales of the firm, then
unrelated diversification is:

Related diversification is the weighted average of firm segment-to-group
shares across segments within all firm groups. If Pji is defined as the share of the
segment i of group j in the total sales of the group and DRj is defined as the
related diversification arising out of operating in several segments within an
industry group j, then:

Since a firm may operate in multiple industry groups, its total related
diversification is:

The entropy measure provides me with separate indices of unrelated and
related diversification to highlight their differing risk and time characteristics
(Boyd et al., 2005). The sum of this related and unrelated index is the firm’s total
diversification. This measure factors in diversity of the firm’s activities both by
number and relative size of the segments. The separation of related and unrelated
diversification into separate indices adds more nuance to this study and the use of
the entropy measure is standard practice in the literature exploring the capital
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structure and diversification relationship (Ngah-Kiing Lim et al., 2009; O'Brien et
al., 2014).

Mediator variables. A contribution of this dissertation is the mediation
mechanism that intervenes in the association between capital structure
heterogeneity and strategic actions. Two separate sets of governance variables are
posited as mediators – CEO stock options and the outside Director stock options.

Executive option data is available through ExecuComp (available from
1996 onwards). Following prior research (Devers, Wiseman, & Holmes, 2007;
Larraza-Kintana, Wiseman, Gomez-Mejia, & Welbourne, 2007; Martin, GomezMejia, & Wiseman, 2013) I utilize the measure of CEO stock options available in
ExecuComp. The Black-Scholes option value of fiscal year awards are used for
CEO options variable. This variable is available directly via ExecuComp.

Also following extant research (Lim & McCann, 2013), I utilize the
outside director stock options data is also available from ExecuComp. This
measure is the average value of director stock options awarded to outside (i.e.
non-employee) directors and therefore the perfect proxy for Board incentives for
monitoring.

Controls. The set of controls used in this study are standard in
investigations of capital structure. I control for firm size using Assets. Since the
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purpose of this study is to investigate the similarities and dissimilarities between
various capital providers – across both debt and equity – alternative sources of
capital, especially firm cash or near cash holdings were also controlled for.
Unlike Transaction Cost Theory’ focus on capital structure as governance
structures, Agency theory argues that the key battles amongst capital providers is
over control of the firm’s free cash flow (Jensen, 1986). Therefore, varying levels
of free cash flow (Operating cash flow – capital expenses) could be a rival
explanation for the results, hence were controlled for. Finally, to account for
growth options and market-based performance, firm market-to-book (using
Compustat variables PRCC_F and CSHO, i.e. fiscal year closing stock price and
shares outstanding) ratio was also included as a control.

Details on the various components of this dataset are in Table 9. The
correlations for these variables in the three datasets are depicted in Tables 10a,
10b and 10c.

Following standard practice in the literature (Martin et. al. 2013), prior to
analysis, all variables were winsorized at the 1% and 99% level to limit the
influence of outliers and then standardized to have mean zero and standard
deviation one.
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Analysis
One of the biggest challenges facing organizational scholars is that
statistical results generated by commonly used OLS or fixed/random panel
regressions may be driven by endogeneity. Endogeneity – which refers to
correlation between the independent variable(s) and error terms – arises from four
sources: measurement error, simultaneous causality, autoregression and omitted
variables (Bascle, 2008; Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003; Semadeni, Withers, &
Certo, 2013). Some or all of these sources may add endogeneity to studies of firm
strategy since:
“The field of strategic management is fundamentally predicated on the
idea that management decisions are endogenous to their expected
performance outcomes – if not, managerial decision making is not
strategic, it is superfluous.”
- Hamilton & Nickerson
(2003: 51)
This study is not immune to the possibility of endogeneity, especially
since the association between capital providers (both equity and debt) and firm
strategic actions may suffer from simultaneous causality, i.e. the causal direction
may be two-way. Therefore, conventional OLS, or panel fixed/random effects
regressions are unsuitable for estimation of parameters in this study.

In order to account for endogeneity, the estimation method I utilize are
two-step Blundell and Bond (Blundell & Bond, 1998) generalized methods of
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moments (GMM) for dynamic panels with robust inference and firm fixed effects
(through differencing of data). The R package plm (Croissant & Millo, 2008) was
used for estimating the models. The last model (# 4) in each table is for CEO or
Director stock options to test the mediation hypotheses. The different dependent
variables are shown together in each model in order to test for the mediation
hypotheses (Shaver, 2005). One limitation of using GMM methodology was that
the use of lag structure of variables as instruments led to loss of usable data, this
is visible from the observations used numbers for each regression model.

Nonetheless, the Blundell and Bond dynamic panel approach – which
utilizes generalized method of moment’s estimator – offers numerous advantages
for this study: First, it accounts for unobserved firm-level heterogeneity since
individual fixed effects are accounted for by differencing the data. Second, it
accounts for the dynamic nature of panel data and the dependent variables whose
values depend on their lagged values. Third, GMM allows me to account for
endogeneity between capital providers and different strategic actions. Fourth, the
robust GMM estimator with Windmeijer corrected standard errors (Blundell,
Bond, & Windmeijer, 2000; Windmeijer, 2005) utilized in this study accounts for
the potential presence of both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Fifth, the
GMM estimator uses the fact that in panel data, the number of instruments
increases with time t, this overcomes a key weakness of conventional 2SLS (Twostage least squares) – namely, the difficulty of finding adequate number of
suitable instruments for firm-level studies. Sixth, use of GMM to test all models
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also allows me to bypass the common oversight found in tests of mediation in
management journals – namely, that testing system of equations (independent
variables regressed on the mediator as well as regressed on dependent variable
with the mediator present to test for combined effect) using OLS (MacKinnon,
Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002) will lead to biased estimates since
error terms in these equations will be correlated. Use of instrumental variable
regression is recommended to ensure correct estimation, especially in the
presence of feedback effects (Shaver, 2005), a concern in this study. Finally, the
system-GMM estimator (Blundell & Bond, 1998) produces smaller bias and more
precise estimates compared to the difference-GMM (Arellano & Bond, 1991)
approach, especially in unbalanced panels with many firms having only a few
years of data available, a common feature of firm level panel data.

All these advantages have led to greater use of GMM in recent
management research (Alessandri & Seth, 2014; Patel & Cooper, 2014). The
instruments utilized in the Blundell and Bond GMM are lagged values of the
independent variables (at t-1 and further lags), as well as lagged values of the
dependent variables (at t-2 and further lags). These ensure that the results
presented are free from endogeneity.
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CHAPTER 5
RESULTS
Table 8a, 8b and 8c present the key descriptive statistics for each of the
datasets in this study. Table 10a, 10b and 10c provide the correlations with
associated significance levels. The results of the GMM regressions are presented
in Tables 11 – 14: for the dependent variables of Unrelated Diversification,
Related Diversification, Mergers & Acquisition and R & D Intensity respectively.
The last model (#4) in each table tests the effect of the independent variables on
the hypothesized mediators (either CEO or outside Director options). Combined
analysis of model #3s (full range of predictors, mediators and controls on strategic
actions) and #4s (full range of predictors and controls on mediator) is used to test
for mediation.

Prior to a discussion of the results, it is important to note that two key
statistics indicate the validity of these two-step system GMM regression models.
First, the Hansen-Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions in which the null
hypothesis is that the specified lagged variables are valid instruments. Nonsignificance of the Hansen-Sargan chi-square statistics for models confirms
instrument validity.

The second key test for GMM models is the Arellano-Bond test of serial
correlation (Arellano & Bond, 1991). A robust estimator was used in the
computation of these measures. Although some first order autocorrelation tests
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are significant. None of the second order autocorrelation tests were significant.
Therefore the assumption of no serial correlation in these models is reasonable
(Alessandri & Seth, 2014; Arellano & Bond, 1991).
Capital Structure And Diversification

I first consider the results of the GMM dynamic panel regressions for
Unrelated and Related Diversification. Unrelated Diversification (see Table 11)
has been negatively associated with firm performance (Palich et al., 2000) since
the “marginal costs of diversification increase rapidly as diversification hits high
levels” (2000: 159). This is perhaps the main driver of the two key shifts in
diversification witnessed amongst U.S. firms, an increase during the 1960’s and a
decrease in the 1980’s (Denis, Denis, & Sarin, 1997). The main arguments against
such “conglomerate” diversification are increased complexity of managing
diverse businesses, internal capital market inefficiencies and diseconomies related
to other inefficiencies.

Model 3 of Table 11 suggests that Transient equityholders are negatively
associated with Unrelated diversification. Therefore, Model 3 (full model with
both compensation and capital structure variables) confirms – contrary to the
hypothesized relationship – the negative association between Transient equity
holders and Unrelated Diversification. Thus, hypothesis 1b is marginally (0.1
level) significant but with an unexpected sign; the association between Transient
equity and Unrelated Diversification is significant but negative. This suggests that
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Transient equity holders provide a sort of market discipline in spite (or perhaps
because) of their reputation for being ‘fluid capital’ (Porter, 1992: 8). Being aware
of the performance drawbacks of unrelated diversification, they do not support it
via an error of omission (to monitor) as Transaction Cost reasoning would
suggest.
The non-significance of the coefficient for Dedicated equity shows that, in
this sample, after accounting for endogeneity, no association exists between
Dedicated equityholders and unrelated diversification (H2c not supported).
Similarly, none of the other hypotheses for unrelated diversification are
supported.

The results for Related Diversification are presented in Table 12.
Transient equity remains negatively associated with related diversification too
(Model 3) thus supporting hypothesis 1c. Taken together with the results of
unrelated diversification, it is clear that the negative influence of short-term equity
holders is persistent over both types of diversification. Interestingly, relational
debt is marginally significant and negative in Model 1 and 3, opposite the
predicted direction in hypothesis 2a. Outside director options are significant and
negatively associated with related diversification (hypothesis 9 a) in Model 2.
These results are further discussed in the Discussion section. I now turn my
attention to the results for innovation.
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Capital Structure And Innovation

The GMM regression models for external innovation/ M & A are
presented in Table 13. In Model 1, coefficients for both Transactional Debt and
Transient Equity are significant and positive. These results are in line with
hypotheses 4a and 4b, which postulates a positive relationship between impatient
capital and external innovation in the form of Mergers and Acquisitions.

In Model 1, Dedicated equity also shows a significant and negative
relationship with M & A, thus supporting hypothesis 5c. This relationship has
reduced significance (p < 0.1) in model 3 (full model with controls, capital
structure and compensation), while the positive influence of Transient
Equityholders on M & A remains positive and highly significant (p < 0.01). The
relationship between Transactional Debt and M & A loses significance in the full
Model 3.

The influence of CEO options on M & A is negative and highly significant
in Models 2 & 3, this is in line with research suggesting that acquirer firms suffer
poorer performance (Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter, & Davison,
2009). Interestingly, Models 3 and 4 show the existence of a mediating
relationship in which Transient Equity has a positive association with M & A
(Model 1 & 3) and a negative association with CEO options (Model 4) – thereby
supporting hypothesis 8d.
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Results for Research and Development are presented in Table 14.
Contrary to prior findings in the literature (David et al., 2008; Wang & Thornhill,
2010), lagged values of relational debt are negatively associated with Research
and Development (Models 1 & 3), i.e. hypothesis 5a is significant but in an
unexpected direction. None of the other hypotheses are significant. This suggests,
in accordance with results for unrelated diversification, that once endogeneity –
an omission in the bulk of capital structure research – is accounted for, some prior
results in the literature between capital structure and firm strategy may not hold.

A summary of all significant results is presented in Table 15.
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CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS
Prior research has devoted a substantial amount of effort to investigate the
associations between firm capital structure and firm strategic actions. In this
dissertation, I contribute to this vast literature by developing and testing theory
that integrates both equity and debt heterogeneity. The results demonstrate that
after controlling for endogeneity – an omission in most of the capital structure
literature – the hypothesized dimensions of risk tolerance and time horizon
definitively and parsimoniously describe the key factors at play in the association
between capital providers and Mergers and Acquisitions. On the other hand, the
mixed results for Diversification and Research and Development suggest that the
role of capital providers is much more nuanced than extant theory explains.

Capital Structure And Diversification

In the case of firm diversification, a broad consensus has developed over
the last decade or so (Palich et al., 2000) that there is an optimal level of related
diversification that is rewarded through higher firm performance. Firms that go
beyond this level into unrelated diversification suffer from diseconomies that
hamper performance.

111

This firm performance driven support for related diversification stems
largely from resource based reasoning (Markides & Williamson, 1996).
According to this logic, “diversification will only support long-run superior
returns when it allows a firm to exploit resources or assets that are unavailable to
its rivals at a competitive cost” (1996: 341).

In order to delve deeper into the unexpected results for diversification I
further analyze the association between firm diversification and performance. I
conducted additional post-hoc analysis – presented in Table 16 – in which marketto-book and firm return-on-assets were used as dependent variables to test the
performance implications of diversification. The results are in line with the
consensus view in that unrelated diversification has clear and significant negative
influence on firm performance. Model 3 of Table 16 shows significance for the
quadratic term for total diversification (sum of related and unrelated
diversification), suggesting an inverted-U shaped relationship between firm
diversification and performance (market-to-book). This confirms that even after
accounting for endogeneity, the results of the meta-analysis conducted by Palich
and colleagues holds.

However, the coefficients for related diversification are neither significant
nor substantial, suggesting that at least for the sample under study the benefits of
related diversification may be overstated. This in spite the fact that, as
hypothesized, Dedicated equityholders support related diversification and
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Transient equityholders do not. Relational debt is, opposite to hypothesized
direction, negatively associated with related diversification. These results
combined with the post-hoc performance analysis suggest a more nuanced
relationship between related diversification and capital structure. Four
interrelated explanations exist for these results for diversification.

First, Markides and Williamson argue that “diversification will only
support long-run superior returns when it allows a firm to exploit resources or
assets that are unavailable to its rivals at a competitive cost…any measure of
relatedness that fails to take into account the characteristics of the resources or
assets being shared” will lead to erroneous conclusions about competitive
advantage (1996: 341). This is perhaps the key reason that related diversification
as measured by conventional industry counts, Herfindahl or Entropy measures
fails to take into account the specific nature of resources being “shared” – which
may in turn drives the lack of meaningful performance benefits of related
diversification.

When discussing their results supporting a curvilinear (inverted-U shaped)
relationship between diversification and firm performance, Palich et.al. (2000:
167) point out that for related diversification, “the effect sizes are not quite as
strong as expected…diversification may not be quite as strong a player as some
have imagined…” When we consider the performance implications, the results for
diversification (especially, the strong and negative association of Transient

113

equityholders) are not surprising. In the face of a real performance drawback,
firms clearly suffer a diversification discount (Denis et al., 1997) as witnessed by
the results in Table 16. The curvilinear relationship between firm diversification
and performance holds even after accounting for endogeneity (see Model 3 of
Table 16).

The second probable explanation for the diversification results is that for
firms to enjoy the fruits of synergy that related diversification promises there must
exist enabling mechanisms within the firm, if not, then these firms either focus or
falter (Nayyar, 1992). Implementation difficulties arising from increased
bureaucratic/ coordination costs, internal transaction costs, intra-firm competition,
incentive distortion and incompatible technologies are some of the factors that
maybe driving the poor performance of even related diversifiers. Fundamentally,
these organizational barriers hamper attempts at obtaining cooperation from
multiple units within firms.

Thirdly, firm knowledge base and technological diversity are key factors
in its ability to leverage related diversification (Miller, 2006), this more nuanced
version of the resource-based argument in favor of related diversification echoes
the rational outlined in the first explanation above. However, similar to the first
explanation, the exclusion of patent based measures of technological diversity in
this study precludes any additional post-hoc tests that incorporate more nuanced
measures of firm resources under consideration for diversification. This limitation
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is indeed one of the most fruitful areas of future research possible for me since
publicly available technology and patenting data of firms is a valuable resource
for investors and researchers alike.

Finally, the results for related diversification (Table 12) suggest that in
spite of their greater involvement in firms, Relational debt holders and Dedicated
equityholders have differing perspectives on related diversification. In spite of
reduced information asymmetries engendered by long-term relationships,
Relational debts negative association with related diversification suggests that
they do not support the firm-specific assets and capabilities generated through
related diversification. On the other had, as hypothesized, Dedicated
equityholders are wholly supportive of related diversification.

The inexorable links between firm resources and diversification strategy
have been part of management discourse at least as far back as Penrose (1959).
The results obtained after rigorous analysis suggest that agency arguments
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) that underlie the early
diversification literature are sound. I have argued earlier that viewed from a
transaction cost lens, debt and equity are de facto governance structures
(Williamson, 1988). However, the self-interest of debt and equityholders seems to
surmount any other considerations. Only partial support is found for transaction
cost reasoning, the clear and negative consequences of firm diversification on
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performance are not in favor of capital providers who seem to prefer more
focused firms.
Capital Structure And Innovation
Similar to diversification, results for Research and Development present a
nuanced picture of capital structure, one that runs contrary to current theory. The
only significant relationship is one between Relational Debt and R & D, and it is
counter to the positive relationship predicted by theory. The difference between
these and prior results may be driven by either lack of endogeneity controls in
prior work (Bushee, 1998; Bushee, 2001) or the nature of samples used: either
Japanese firms (David et al., 2008) and 1980’s U.S. oil companies (Wang &
Thornhill, 2010).

A more optimistic explanation maybe that the myopic investor behavior
institutional investors have been accused of, is a legacy of the 1980’s, and is no
longer the case as the level of sophistication of institutional investors and
corporate governance practices have evolved. An early indicator of this is visible
in Bushee’ 1998 study that investigated institutional investor holdings and its
impact on managerial tendency to cut R & D expenditures when facing an
earnings shortfall:
“A possible explanation for the negative relation between institutional
ownership and the decision to cut R & D is that institutions prefer to invest
in more innovative firms that are unlikely to cut R & D under any
circumstances.”
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- Bushee (1998: 322)

A more pessimistic explanation maybe that lack of significance for
equityholder influence on R & D in this large sample suggest the possibility that
prior results obtained by Bushee are either an artifact of endogeneity or sampling
period (1980’s-early 1990’s). A future direction for my research will be to expand
both the sample size and period to investigate this possibility.

The negative and significant relationship of relational debt and R & D is
contrary to prior findings amongst Japanese firms (David et al., 2008). Perhaps
the more communitarian nature of Japanese banking (O'Brien et al., 2014)
compared to U.S. banks explains these results. The opaque nature of R & D that
develops firm-specific “stock of strategic resources such as innovative
capabilities” (Vincente-Lorente, 2001: 162) may be too opaque even for relational
debt holders. A limitation of this study, and concomitant future direction, is to
directly account for relational debtholders by incorporating their representation on
firm board of directors. It is likely that board representation is a mediating or
moderating factor in their influence on firm strategic actions.

The issue of strategic opacity and information asymmetries may also
explain why the theoretical framing (see Table 7) of capital providers along the
dimensions of risk tolerance and time horizon perfectly explains their attitudes
towards Mergers and Acquisitions. Unlike internal, operationally focused
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strategic actions like diversification and R & D, M & A activity tends to make
more data publicly available due to higher business combination disclosures
(Shalev, 2009).

This explains why impatient capital (quadrant 1 in Table 7), which doesn’t
have the firm-specific knowledge to evaluate either diversification or R & D
strategies, can act on publicly disclosed M & A strategies and events. Contrary to
such impatient capital, Dedicated equityholders and CEO’s have firm-specific
investments that are long-term in nature and maybe harmed by the negative
performance impact (Haleblian et al., 2009) acquirers face. Furthermore, these
strong results suggest future directions for investigating capital structure and M &
A: does hubris increase CEO propensity for mergers (Hayward & Hambrick,
1997), i.e. would the negative impact of CEO options on M & A change if CEO
hubris was accounted for? How would the presence of diverse capital providers
affect these relationships?
Levers Available To Capital Providers

The lack of support for most of the hypothesized mediation relationships
(except H8 d) suggests that levers other than CEO options and Director options
may be linking capital structure and strategic actions. These levers run the gamut
from proxy fights and corporate resolutions available to equityholders to Board of
Director representation, and litigation available to both equity and debtholders. In
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addition, debt covenant violations are another source of influence available to
debtholders.

Proxy fights are perhaps the most direct way in which equityholders can
influence management (Campbell, Campbell, Sirmon, Bierman, & Tuggle, 2012).
A key example of such use of proxy contests is the selection of Board members.
Post the 2007-08 financial crisis, the SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission)
recognized the broad failure of corporate governance and responded by
introducing Rule 25 in 2010 to directly address a key point of governance failure
– the lack of truly independent members on the Board. This rule allows long-term
shareholders (at least 3 years of equity ownership in firm) with 3% or greater
equityholdings in firms to nominate their own choices for the Board of Directors.
Campbell and colleagues found that the passing of Rule 25 increased firm value
(measured by abnormal return around the event). This finding highlights that post
2010 (the ending year for my dissertation sample), equityholder influence on
director selection improved – thereby suggesting another future research
direction: expanding my sample period beyond 2010 and incorporating proxy
contests as a mediation mechanism between capital providers and firm strategic
action. A similar role could be played by corporate resolutions.

A lever of influence available to both equityholders and debtholders is
litigation. For example, firms whose Boards are dominated by insiders are known
to suffer from more shareholder lawsuits (Kesner & Johnson, 1990). Such
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securities class-action lawsuits can be detrimental to management and have been
linked with executive turnover, higher capital costs, reputational penalties,
reduced payouts to shareholders etc. (Shi, Connelly, & Sanders, 2015). A recent
(Shi et al., 2015) study found that higher vertical pay gaps – i.e. between CEO
and other top executives – also lead to managerial misconduct, a common
precursor to such equityholder litigation. Interestingly, such litigation has also
been found to raise the cost of relational debt (Deng, Willis, & Xu, 2014).

A lever specifically available to debtholders is debt covenants (e.g.
maintaining a minimum current ratio). Violation of these covenants in debt
contracts directly influences managerial discretion over investment (Chava &
Roberts, 2008). For example, violation of even financial covenants (those not
related to payment of interest or principal), termed technical defaults, shift control
rights from management to debtholders. Such violations have been linked with a
13% decline in capital expenditures compared to pre-violation levels (2008: 2087)
as debtholders proceed to punish management for perceived misbehavior. These
levers, along with Board representation discussed in Chapter 2 (see page 45)
suggest multiple future directions to further investigate the mediating mechanisms
between capital structure and firm strategic actions.
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Limitations And Contributions

Like all research, this study is not devoid of limitations. Some of these are:
restricted sample size due to limited data availability for relational debt through
Osiris, exclusion of technological diversity measures based on patents to better
account for relational diversification, lack of Board level data to test for actual
Board representation by capital providers. A methodological limitation due to the
use of GMM is the bias in this study towards firms with multi-year data available,
thereby eliminating newly public/ young firms from the sample. Nonetheless,
none of these are insurmountable challenges, and in fact offer fruitful directions
for future research.

In this dissertation I offer four significant contributions to the capital
structure literature. First, the key contribution of this study is the incorporation of
diverse capital providers – across both debt and equity – to explore their
commonalities and differences. Extant research highlights that neither all equity
holders (Hoskisson et al., 2002) nor all debt holders (David et al., 2008) speak
with the same voice. This suggests the possibility that some equity holders may be
aligned less with other equity holders and more with certain debt holders, and vice
versa. The usual separation of the equityholder and debtholder literatures may, in
other words, undermine our ability to credibly understand the relationship
between capital structure and strategic choices made by firms.
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The results clearly indicate that the nature of strategic actions matter and
that the commonalities between debtholders and equityholders – as clearly visible
in the results for Mergers and Acquisitions – have been ignored in the literature.
Equity is not a pillow and Debt is not a sword, but these have highly contextual
and variegated influences on firm management and strategy. Therefore their
persistent separation in the literature is detrimental to both theory development
and practical resonance. This work offers to be a first step in remedying this lapse.

The second contribution I make in this dissertation is conceptualizing
capital providers along the dimensions of risk tolerance and time horizon. By
creating a parsimonious categorization of capital – across equity and debt – and
testing it across multiple strategic actions, I demonstrate the commonalities and
not just the differences between types of equity and debt. The results for M & A
definitively show that the two proposed dimensions of risk tolerance and time
horizon drive capital providers association with M & A. This supports the theory
proposed in this dissertation – namely, that through applying a transaction cost
lens, capital providers can be categorized along their underlying dimensions of
time horizon and risk tolerance. Please see page 65 onwards for a more detailed
discussion of these two dimensions.

The third contribution of this dissertation is to specify and test executive
options as a mediating mechanism linking capital structure and strategic actions.
The results for M & A again demonstrate the critical role CEO options play in
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aligning the interests of capital providers with firm management. The support
found for hypothesis 8d (positing that CEO stock options will negatively and
partially mediate the association between transient equity and M & A) gives
greater credence to the behavioral-agency (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998) view
that executive stock options increase risk-bearing of executives and thereby
reduce their risk-taking by aggravating loss-aversion. The lack of support for the
mediation hypotheses for diversification and R & D suggest that capital providers
may influence firm management through some other lever(s), such as those
discussed above. Incorporation of these additional levers is a potentially
promising future direction for my research.

Fourth and finally, a key contribution I make in this dissertation is the
methodological choice of GMM that allows me to control for endogeneity. The
fact that after controlling for endogeneity, many of the “established” results in the
literature disappear in this study suggests that they may be driven by
methodological choices made in previous works. Seminal works from the 1980’searly 2000’s on capital structure used analytical tools like OLS, structural
equation modeling and more recently fixed effects regressions. None of these
account for the endogenous nature of the capital structure and firm strategy
relationship. Although recent capital structure research accounts for endogeneity,
much of prior theory remains open to reassessment. This along with the other
issues mentioned earlier indicate that the conversation on capital structures’

123

influence on firm strategy is far from settled, thereby giving me ample scope for
research projects beyond this dissertation.
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TABLES & FIGURES
TABLE 1: Homogeneous debt & equity
Citation
Bettis (1983)

Peavy (1984)

Capital
Structure
Measures
N/A, theory
paper

Sample

Theoretical Lens

Strategic Variables & Implications

N/A, theory
paper

Call for synthesis between
financial theory and
corporate strategy

Three conundrums: 1) financial theory
suggests equity markets don’t reward
firm specific (unsystematic) risk – the
core of strategy. 2) Info asymmetries
due to competitive secrecy and 3)
Capital availability and performance
differences between U.S. &
international firms

N/A, theory
paper

N/A, theory
paper

Response to Bettis (1983)
and reconciliation between
financial theory and
corporate strategy

Response to two Bettis’ (1983)
conundrums:
1) Recommendation of financial theory
to diversify unsystematic (i.e. firmlevel) risk is not contradictory to
management of such risks through
strategy. 2) Information increasing cash
flow predictability, without damaging
future cash flows, should be released

Barton &
Gordon
(1987)

N/A, theory
paper

N/A, theory
paper

Sandberg et
al. (1987)

Firm leverage

Lubatkin &
O’Neill
(1987)

Leverage
(book value of
long term debt/
book value of
assets)

Barton &
Gordon
(1988)

Owner’s
equity/Invested
capital (inverse
of leverage)

456 S & P
industrial
firms with
publicly
traded debt
(in 1978)
297 U.S.
mergers and
large
acquisitions
(> $10
million)
between
1954-1973
279 U.S.
firms part of
1974 Fortune
500 list still
active in
1982

Critique of financial theory.
Posits that strategy (i.e.
managerial choice) helps
explain capital structure
decisions
Managerial choice

Firm level capital structure affected by
context and managerial values.
Therefore, this decision better studied
through managerial/strategy perspective

Capability and competitive
advantage: tangible,
intangible and competitor
interrelationships (1987:
670)

Diversification via mergers. Leverage
positively associated with related
diversification as these reduce
systematic risk, i.e. market-level risks
(1987: 671, 680)

Managerial choice

Diversification (proxy for managerial
propensity for risk-taking). Unrelated
diversification and growth rates
positively associated with debt levels.
Profitability negatively associated with
debt
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Debt coverage. Historical mean and
standard deviation of ROA can be used
to determine probability of debt default

Chatterjee &
Wernerfelt
(1991)

Debt (Long
term debt to
market value)

118 U.S.
firms
between
1981 and
1985

Resource & capabilities

Diversification. Physical & intangible
assets support related diversification.
Financial assets support unrelated
diversification. Innovation associated
with related diversification in both high
and low-performing firms

Balakrishna
Leverage
& Fox (1993)
(book
value of total
debt-tomarket value
of equity &
book value of
debt, this ratio
then log
transformed)

295 single
business
U.S. firms
between
1978 and
1987

TCE (Transaction Cost
Economics)

Asset attributes (tangibility &
specificity). Fundamental conflict
between a resource driven strategy and
debt financing. Generally, RBV
(Resource Based View) pushes for firmspecific assets while debt holders want
redeployable assets. Advertising
(intangibility of assets) builds
reputational advantages and increases
debt capacity

Long &
Ravenscraft
(1993)

Debt

72 U.S.
LBOs
(leveraged
buyouts)
between
1981
between
1987

Agency & capital market
imperfections (information
asymmetries & moral
hazard)

R & D in firms undergoing LBOs. R &
D intensity drops by 40% in firms
undergoing LBOs. Agency theory
(debts disciplines managers’ propensity
for pet projects, including R & D)
predicts the direction of this decline.
Capital market imperfections predict the
extent of this decline

Lowe et al.
(1994)

Debt to equity

Replication
of Barton &

Firm risk and debt

Diversification. Corporate strategy
influences capital structure, especially

127

Gordon
(1988) using
Australian
data (176
firms
between
1984-88)

in the most diversified firms

Taylor &
Lowe (1995)

Debt to equity
(inverse of
Barton &
Gordon, 1988
measure)

176
Australian
and 279 U.S.
firms

Capital market
imperfections

Diversification. Capital markets reward
focused (i.e. low diversification) firms
since they are easier to understand

Kocchar &
Hitt (1998)

Debt & equity

187 U.S.
manufacturin
g firms
following
diversificatio
n strategy
between
1982 and
1986

TCE

Diversification. Reciprocal relationship
between capital structure and
diversification. Equity financing
associated with related diversification
and debt financing associated with
unrelated diversification

Simerly & Li
(2000)

Leverage

700 large
U.S. firms

Agency & TCE

Environmental dynamism. Leverage
positively associated with firm
performance in stable environments,
negatively associated with firm
performance in dynamic environments
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VincenteLorente
(2001)

Leverage:
Market (total
debt to market
value of
equity) and
Accounting
(total debt to
book value
equity plus
book value of
debt)

52
nonfinancial
Spanish
firms
between
1990 and
1994

Resource Based View
(RBV): Factor market
imperfections

Resource features (opacity and
specificity). Resource specificity and
opacity limit borrowing capacity. A
resource driven strategy creates
financial constraints for firms

O’Brien
(2003)

Leverage
(book
value of debt
to
total market
value
of firm)

16,358 U.S.
firms listed
on
Compustat
for at least 2
years
between
1980 and
1999. 91,000
firm-year
observations

Behavioral theory of the
firm (BTOF)

Slack and innovation. R & D intensity
of firm is not merely its stock of
intangible resources, but indicates the
strategic importance of innovation to the
firm. Such an innovation strategy is
negatively associated with leverage

Ngah-Kiing
Lim et al.
(2009)

Debt (longterm debt to
total capital,
log
transformed)

245 publicly
listed firms
in Singapore
between
1995 and
2000

Agency and Contingency

Environmental dynamism and
Diversification. Debt association with
unrelated diversification: positive in
dynamic environments, and negative in
stable. Argue that managers exploit
dynamic environments to raise more
debt. Bidirectional causal relation
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between debt financing and
diversification strategy
OforiDankwa &
Julian (2013)

Equity to sales
ratio

100 largest
Ghanaian
companies
between
1996 and
1999

Institutional theory subset
of institutional difference
hypothesis
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Environmental dynamism. Contingency
effects of environment on capital
structure and performance relationship
are different in emerging market
context. Specifically, unlike findings in
developed countries, in Ghana, sector
dynamism (environmental dynamism
measured at industry sector level, see
2013: 1429) negatively moderates
relationship between equity and firm
performance

TABLE 2: Equity heterogeneity
Citation

Capital
Structure
Measures
Stockholder
concentration
and Insider
ownership

Sample

Theoretical
Lens

94 research
intensive
firms listed in
the Fortune
500 in 1980

Agency and Innovation and Diversification. Stock concentration
Contingency positively associated with innovation and negatively
theory.
associated with diversification. Outsiders on board
discourage innovation and support diversification
(opposite of hypothesized relationship).
Diversification relevant in declining industries. R &
D relevant in industries with changing product and
process technologies

Graves
(1988)

Institutional
ownership
concentration

22 computer
Investor
manufacturing myopia
firms between
1976 to 1985

Innovation. Confounding of time trend and
institutional ownership effects on innovation.
Generally, negative association between institutional
owners and innovation

Baysinger
et al.
(1991)

Institutional
ownership
concentration

176 Fortune
500 firms
(1980)

Innovation. Institutional equity holder concentration
positively associated with firm innovation

Chaganti
&
Damanpo
ur (1991)

Outside
institutional
equity holders
and insider
ownership

80 U.S.
Power and
manufacturing resource
firms between dependence
1983 and
1985

Hill &
Snell
(1988)

Corporate
governance

131

Strategic Variables & Implications

Debt-capital ratio & firm performance. Family
ownership increases debt-capital ratio, while outside
institutional ownership reduces it. Combined, they
lower the debt-capital ratio. Influence of institutional
and executive ownership are additive to performance

Hansen &
Hill
(1991)

Institutional
and insider
ownership

125 U.S.
research
intensive
firms between
1977 and
1987

Investor
myopia vs.
efficient
markets

Innovation. No evidence for myopic institutional
investors. Positive (but weak) relationship observed
between institutional ownership and innovation

Bethel &
Liebeskin
d (1993)

Blockholder
and insider
ownership

100 (93 final
sample)
randomly
selected U.S.
firms from
Fortune 500
list of 1981
that survived
as public
firms till 1987

Restructuring. Outside blockholders have the
incentives and power to ensure efficient firm
management. Blockholders associated with reduced
diversification, i.e. refocusing

Gibbs
(1993)

Blockholders
and
management
equity.
Leverage

70 firms
selected from
Business
Week 1982
Corporate
Scoreboard

Agency vs.
Environmen
tal
antecedents
(e.g.
deregulation
and
financial
innovation)
of
restructuring
Agency
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Restructuring (financial & portfolio). Restructuring
motivated by agency costs. Board power associated
with reduced restructuring. Overall support for free
cash flow hypothesis of restructuring (Jensen, 1986)

Hoskisson
et al.
(1994)

Debt and
insider equity

203 U.S.
firms
initiating
divestments
between 1985
and 1990

Graves &
Waddock
(1994)

Number and
453 of S & P
equity
500 firms in
concentration 1990
of institutional
investors

Agency

Restructuring (divestment). Diversification
positively associated with relative debt intensity
(adjusted for industry), which in turn is positively
associated with divestment. Outside board members
associated with debt-intensive strategies in divesting
firms. Greater equity per blockholder detrimental to
performance

Riskreduction
and efficient
markets

Corporate social performance (CSP). Investments in
CSP reduce risk (due to potential regulatory
sanctions, legal and consumer retaliation). CSP
found to be positively associated with number of
institutional investors

Davis &
N/A
Thompson
(1994)

N/A

Social
movements

Shareholder activism. Three trends drove activism
trend in 1980’s: 1) Concentration of ownership
amongst public pension funds, 2) Elaboration of
fiduciary duties for such funds and 3) Spread of
antitakeover activity amongst corporations.
Structure of corporations not only driven by capital
markets but also by political processes drive
opportunities for activism

Wright et
al. (1996)

358 U.S.
firms in 1986
and 514 in
1992

Incentives,
growth
opportunitie
s and risktaking

Corporate risk-taking (standard deviation of
analyst’s forecast of earnings per share). High levels
of insider ownership associated with lower risktaking for firms with growth opportunities.
Institutional ownership associated with greater risktaking for firms with growth opportunities

Insider,
institutional
ownership and
blockholders
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Zahra
(1996)

Institution (by
type) and
executive
ownership.

127 Fortune
500 firms in
1988

Agency

Kocchar
& David
(1996)

Brickley et al.
(1988) equity
holder
classification.

135 U.S.
Comparison
manufacturing of investor
firms in 1989 myopia,
superior
investor and
active
investor
hypotheses
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Corporate entrepreneurship. Long-term institutional
ownership (mutual, pension & retirement funds)
associated with both innovation and venturing.
Short-term institutions (investment banks & private
funds) negatively associated with both innovation
and venturing
Innovation (new product announcements). Pressureresistant institutions associated with innovation
(active investor hypothesis)

Lane et al.
(1998)

Li &
Simerly
(1998)

Strong-owner
controlled
(30% or
greater
equity), weakowner control
(30-10%
equity) and
managementcontrolled
(10% or less
equity)

Study 1: 309
U.S. firms
between 1957
and 1972

Insider (CEO)
ownership
and leverage

90 U.S. firms
between 1990
and 1993. 51
from
computer and
electronics
industry and
39 firms from
good and
beverage

Study 2: 289
mergers
between 1980
and 1987

Replication
of Amihud
& Lev
(1981).
Argues
against any
agency
theoretic
link between
equity
holders and
diversificati
on
Contingency
in the form
of
environment
al dynamism
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Diversification. Study 1: Blockholders have no
impact on acquisition strategy. 40% of managementcontrolled firms are constrained diversifiers, which
offers the best combination of risk and return (1998:
565)
Study 2: No association between ownership and
merger type. No evidence of board vigilance (sum of
standardized outsiders on board and their equity)
and corporate strategy

Firm performance. Greater positive association
between insider ownership and performance in
industries experiencing high environmental
dynamism

Johnson & Institution (by
Greening
type)
(1999)

252 firms
randomly
selected from
KLD (Kinder,
Lydenberg, Domini,
and Company
database) for
1993

Institutional
& signaling
theory

CSP. Public pensions funds, outsider director
representation and top management equity positively
associated with product quality dimension of CSP

Thomsen
&
Pedersen
(2000)

Institution (by
type)

435 European
firms between
1990 and
1995

Owner
identity

Firm performance. Owner identity (i.e. equity holder
heterogeneity) associated with differential firm
performance. Corporate, family and government
owners negatively associated with market-to-book.
Bank ownership positively associated with marketto-book (as well as ROA) compared to institutional
owners. Sales growth highest when majority owner
is family firm or another company

David et
al. (2001)

Public
pension funds

Panel data of
73 firms
between 1987
and 1993

Activism

Innovation (R & D inputs/investments, and
outputs/products). Institutional activism (proxybased) positively associated with R & D inputs. This
association is amplified in strategic contexts where
innovation is critical, i.e., high-tech industries. Also,
the R & D inputs mediate the association between
activism and R & D outputs
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Hoskisson
et al.
(2002)

Institution (by
type)

234 firms (> $
30 million
revenues)
between 1985
and 1991

Investment
horizons

Ramaswa
my et al.
(2002)

Brickley et al.
(1988) equity
holder
classification

88 Indian
Agency
manufacturing
firms between
1993 and
1994

Diversification. In their Indian sample, authors find
that pressure-sensitive investors (banks) support
unrelated diversification while pressure-resistant
investors (mutual funds and financial institutions)
discourage it

Gedajlovi
c&
Shapiro
(2002)

Ownership
concentration

344 Japanese
firms between
1986-1991

Agency and
redistributio
n.

Inter-corporate profit redistribution. Ownership
concentration positively associated with corporate
profitability. Large stakes held by financial and nonfinancial partners associated by profit redistribution;
i.e., least profitable firms (ROA levels < 2%)
benefit, while the most profitable firms experience
negative associations between profitability and such
equity owners. Overall, redistribution effects
stronger than agency effects (2002: 573)

Chang
(2003)

Controlling
equity holders
in Korean
groupaffiliated
companies.

419 Korean
chaebol
affiliates
between 1986
and 1996

Agency

Firm performance. Performance associated with
ownership but not vice versa. Controlling equity
holders exploit insider information to increase equity
stakes in profitable companies
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Innovation (Internal/R & D, and External/
Acquisitions). Pension funds more positively
associated with internal innovation (i.e. R & D),
while investment managers more positively
associated with external innovation (acquisitions)

Lee &
O’Neil
(2003)

Ownership
concentration.

1,044 U.S.
firms and 270
Japanese
firms in 1995.

Agency and
stewardship

Innovation. Country context matters, agency
perspective more appropriate for U.S. while
stewardship more appropriate for Japan. Stock
concentration associated with innovation in U.S., but
not in Japan. On average, Japanese firms invest
more in innovation

Sanders &
Carpenter
(2003)

Insider
ownership

250 randomly
selected S &
P 500 firms
between 1992
and 1995

Behavioralagency
theory

Innovation and stock repurchases. Executives use
stock repurchases to mollify shareholders and
mitigate information asymmetry generated by
innovation. Such “strategic satisficing” exacerbated
by executive stock options and firms missing
performance expectations.

Tihanyi et
al. (2003)

Institution (by
type)

197 firms
from 1996 S
& P 1500
population

Agency

Diversification (international). Professional
investment funds and pension funds positively
associated with international diversification. The
former association positively moderated by outside
directors, and the latter by inside director incentives

Citation

Capital
Structure
Measures
State
ownership

Sample

Theoretical
Lens

Strategic Variables & Implications

769 Chinese
firms between
1980 and
1989

Resource
dependence
and
Institutional
theory

Firms in transition economies imitate local and high
status firm’s borrowing strategies. Retained earnings
associated with increased borrowing from external
sources, in order to reduce state dependence

Keister
(2004)
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Yoshikaw
a et al.
(2005)

Institution (by
type)

996 Japanese
manufacturing
firms between
1998 and
2002

StakeholderAgency
theory.
Foreign vs.
domestic
owners

Wage intensity (wages to sales ratio). Equity holder
heterogeneity associated with firm investments in
human resources. Domestic owners positively and
foreign owners negatively associated with wage
intensity. Domestic owner support for human capital
higher in low performing firms but foreign owners
reduce support for human capital in such firms

Gedajlovi
c et al
(2005)

Institution (by
type) and
insider
ownership

247 Japanese
manufacturing
firms between
1996-1998

Marketoriented vs.
stable
investors

Dividend payouts positively associated with foreign
shareholders and pension funds. Capital
expenditures positively associated with foreign
ownership and negatively with insider ownership.
Stock market beta positively associated with
investment trusts, and negatively with pension funds

Neubaum
& Zahra
(2006)

Institution (by
type)

Fortune 500
firms: 357 in
1995 and 383
in 2000

Stakeholder
salience

CSP. Long-term institutional investors (pension
funds) positively associated with CSP. This
relationship strengthened by investor activism

Kim et al.
(2008)

Institution (by
type)

253 Korean R Agency
& D intensive
manufacturing
firms between
1998 and
2003
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Slack and Innovation. Financial slack has inverted-U
shaped relationship with R & D. Family ownership
positively moderates the slack and innovation
association. Domestic institutional investors and
foreign investors negatively moderate this
relationship

David et
al. (2010)

1,180
Japanese
firms between
1990 and
2004
Transient and 72 Fortune
dedicated
500 firms,
institutional
between 1997
investors
and 2006,
(Bushee, 1998 comprising 36
& 2001).
rivalries

Relational
vs.
transactional
governance.

Diversification (international). For relational
(Japanese) owners, sales and employment growth is
the objective of diversification. Transactional
(foreign) owners more focused on profits

Agency

Competitive actions (strategic vs. tactical). Tactical
actions (e.g. price changes & service improvements)
positively associated with transient investors.
Strategic actions (long term actions involving
significant firm resources) positively associated with
dedicated investors and negatively associated with
transient investors

Le &
O'Brien
(2010)

State
ownership
and debt

1300 Chinese
firms between
2003 and
2005

Agency

Agency role of debt offsets the negative impact of
state ownership (principal-principal problem) on
firm performance

Bruton et
al.
(2010)

Ownership
concentration
and private
equity type
(business
angels and
venture
capitalists)

224 IPO’s in
the United
Kingdom and
France.

Agency

IPO performance. Ownership concentration
positively associated with IPO performance,
however this association is negative in U.K. IPO’s
compared to French IPO’s. Association of price
premium is negative with venture capital ownership
and positive with business angel ownership

Connelley
et al.
(2010)

Domestic vs.
foreign
owners in
Japan.
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Okhmatov
skiy
(2010)

Government
ownership
(>5%), state
owned
enterprise
(>25%),
number and
proportion of
government
officials on
board

Russian
Political
banks. 450 in embeddedne
2001, 640
ss
banks in 2003
and 555 banks
in 2005

Firm performance (ROA and ROE). Banks with
board and ownership ties to state owned enterprises
have higher ROA. Banks with government officials
on board have lower ROA than “unconnected”
banks, suggested use of banks by government for
low interest funding of projects

Colpan et
al. (2011)

Domestic vs.
foreign
owners in
Japan.

96 Japanese
electronics
firms between
1992 and
2002

Relational
vs.
transactional
governance.

Domestic corporate owners positively associated
with product diversification. Firm performance
positively moderates relationship between foreign
ownership and changes in capital investment. Even
domestic owners have heterogeneous goals, with
domestic financial owners exhibiting characteristics
between foreign portfolio investors and domestic
relational owners (2011: 612)

O’Brien & Domestic vs.
David
foreign
(2013)
owners in
Japan.

2,123
Japanese
firms between
1992 and
2004

Behavioral
Innovation. For performance exceeding expectations
theory of the “communitarian” (Japanese) owners increase R &D
firm
to greater extent than “contractarian” (foreign)
owners
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Julian &
OforiDankwa
(2013)

ROE

41 Ghanaian
firms between
2003 and
2005 that
were African
controlled

Institutional
difference
hypothesis

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR measured as
ratios of firm expenditures on CSR initiatives to
sales and equity, as well as log of CSR
expenditures). Greater availability of financial
resources (ROS, ROE and net profits) associated
with lower CSR

Inoue et al
(2013)

Minority state
ownership

367 Brazilian
firms between
1995 and
2009

Institutional
voids in
emerging
markets

Firm performance and capital investments. Minority
state ownership positively associated with firm ROA
as well as capital investments by financial
constrained firms with growth opportunities

Liu et al
(2014)

Share
turnover,
concentration
and financial
leverage

221 North
American
establishment
s

Strategic
Human
Capital

Share turnover, concentration and financial leverage
associated with short-term thinking i.e. reduced
investments in strategic human capital
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TABLE 3: Debt heterogeneity
Citation

Capital
Structure
Measure
Debt holders on
board of
directors.

Sample

Theoretical
Lens

Strategic Variables & Implications

22 large U.S.
manufacturing
firms between
1956 and 1983

Resource
dependence

Firm financing. Positive association
between: money market banker and
investment banker with short-term
borrowing. Presence of either money
market banker or investment banker
associated with long-term public
bonds. Insurance company executive
negatively associated with long-term
public bonds

Mizruchi &
Stearns (1994)

Financial
representation on
board of
directors.

22 large U.S.
manufacturing
firms between
1956 and 1983

Resource
dependence

Firm financing. Firms with CEOs
from finance background more likely
to tap debt financing. Representative
of financial institution on board is
strong predictor of debt financing.
Also, family firms more likely to tap
debt markets than managementcontrolled firms

Davis &
Mizruchi
(1999)

Centrality of
banks in
corporate
networks. Shift
from private
(bank) debt to
public (bond)

50 largest
Financial
commercial bank intermediation
holding
companies and
the 500 largest
industrial firms
(the Fortune 500),

Stearns &
Mizruchi
(1993)
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Director interlocks. Decline in bank
centrality in corporate networks from
1980’s onwards. Between 1982-1994
bank boards shrunk, with fewer
corporate executives on their boards.
Firms under threat (low solvency)
appoint bankers on board

debt.

25 largest
diversified
financials, 25
largest retailers,
and 25 largest
transportation
firms in the U.S.
during each of
four panel years:
1982, 1986, 1990,
and 1994 (1999:
226)

Uzzi &
Gillespie
(2002)

Banks of small
Mixed methods,
Embeddedness Firm financing. Embedded ties
and medium sized ethnography and & capability
between banks and firm’s lead to
firms.
quantitative
greater access to bank capital and
analysis using
networks. These in turn enhance
National Survey
firm’s management of trade credit
of Small Business
and reduce late payment penalties
Finances data

Tihanyi &
Hegarty
(2007)

N/A

Longitudinal
multiple case
studies in Czech
Republic and
Hungary
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Organizational In transition from central planning to
fields
market economies, both Czech
Republic and Hungary witnessed coevolution of banking as well as
regulatory institutions

David et al.
(2008)

Debt
heterogeneity
(relational vs.
transactional).

1,853 Japanese
firms between
1982 and 2002

TCE

Innovation. Debt homogeneity
assumption false. Debt heterogeneity
indicates that relational (bank loan)
debt has features that support
innovation
This in spite of hazards of asset
specificity, uncertainty and
appropriability

O’Brien &
David (2010)

Debt
heterogeneity
(relational vs.
transactional)

2,182 Japanese
firms between
1992 and 2002

Agency and
rules vs.
discretion

Firm growth. Transactional debt
similar to a rules regime while
relational debt similar to a
discretionary regime. Transactional
debt effective in curtailing wasteful
growth

Wang &
Thornhill
(2010)

Debt
heterogeneity
(relational vs.
transactional).
Also incorporates
financing
instruments (i.e.
common &
convertible
securities).

39 U.S.
TCE
petroleum firms
between 1976 and
2005

Innovation. Innovation has an
inverted U-shaped effect on
financing through relational debt.

O’Brien et al.
(2013)

Debt
heterogeneity
(relational vs.
transactional).

1,986 Japanese
firms between
1991 and 2001

Diversification. Relational debt
mirrors hierarchies and transactional
debt mirrors markets. Related
diversification improves
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Agency, RBV
& TCE.

performance. Debt (especially
transactional debt) negatively affects
magnitude of these performance
gains
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TABLE 4: The market-hierarchy dichotomy
Market
No

Hierarchy
High/Negotiable

Ownership Concentration

Low/Dispersed

High

Regime (Kydland &
Prescott, 1977)
Cultural Orientation
(O'Brien & David, 2014)

Rules

Discretion

Contractarian

Communitarian

Forbearance

TABLE 5: Capital structure through a transaction cost lens

Time Horizon

Market
Short

Hierarchy
Long

Risk Tolerance

Low

High

No

High/Negotiable

Ownership Concentration

Low/Dispersed

High

Regime (Kydland &
Prescott, 1977)
Capital Structure as
Governance Structure
(Williamson, 1988)
Cultural Orientation
(O'Brien & David, 2014)

Rules

Discretion

Debt

Equity

Contractarian

Communitarian

Transactional

Relational

Transient

Dedicated

Forbearance

Capital Structure:
Debt (Boot, 2000)
Equity (Bushee, 1998)
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TABLE 6: Governance attributes of capital structure
Attributes of Governance
Structure
1. Resource ownership

Market (transactional
debt & transient equity)
Autonomous.

Hierarchy (relational debt
& dedicated equity)
Joint.

2. Incentive intensity

High-powered incentives.

3. Primary control
mechanisms
4. Adaptation

Contracts, covenants,
ratings and pricing signals.
Autonomous (usually price
driven).
Rules regime.

Flat or low-powered
incentives.
Administrative (e.g. Board
of Directors).
Cooperation.

5. Regime (Kydland &
Prescott, 1977)
6. Contract Law
(Williamson, 1991)
7. Type of Opportunism
most likely (Alchian &
Woodward, 1988;
Hennart, 1993; Oxley,
1997)
8. Alignment mechanism
(mediators)

Discretionary regime.

Classical (arbitration and
litigation).
Holdup due to specificity
and
Appropriability hazard due
to weak property rights.

Neoclassical (excuse
doctrine and forbearance).
Moral Hazard due to
plasticity/discretion.

Executive compensation.

Board of Directors.
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TABLE 7: Risk tolerance & time horizon

Risk Tolerance
Low Risk

High Risk

Time Horizon

Transactional debt
Transient equity
Short
Time
Horizon

Long
Time
Horizon

Impatient Capital

Activist Debt & Equity

1

Owner-managed &
Family firms

Dedicated equity
Relational debt
4
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2

Patient Capital

3

FIGURE 1: Capital Structure and Diversification

Transactional Debt

H1a (+)

CEO Stock Options
H7*(+) & H8* (-)

Transient Equity

H1b (+)

H2c

(-)

H1c

Dedicated Equity

Unrelated
Diversification

(-)

H2b (
+)

BOD: Director
Incentives
H9*(+)
)
H2a (+

Relational Debt

* Mediation hypotheses 7, 8 & 9. H1a established in literature.
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Related
Diversification

FIGURE 2: Capital Structure and Innovation

Transactional Debt

H4a (+)

External
Innovation

CEO Stock Options
H7*(+) & H8*(-)

Transient Equity

H5c

H4b (+)

Dedicated Equity
H5b (
+)

(-)

H4c

(-)

BOD: Director
Incentives
H9*(+)
)
H5a (+

Relational Debt

* Mediation hypotheses 7, 8 & 9. H 5a & 5b established in literature.
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Internal
Innovation

TABLE 8a: Descriptive statistics of unstandardized Diversification data
Descriptive Statistics Diversification Sample
Statistic
Dedicated
Transient
Relational
Transactional
Unrelated
Diversification
Related
Diversification
R and D Intensity
CEO Stock
Options
Director Options
Assets
Cash_NearCash
Market-To-Book
Free Cash Flow

N

Mean

St. Dev.

Min

Max

4,593
4,936
3,248
3,248

8.56
17.19
0.0004
1.00

7.74
13.28
0.002
0.002

0.01
0.01
0.00
0.95

36.81
61.97
0.05
1.00

4,307

1.06

1.20

0.00

5.25

4,982

0.86

1.18

0.00

5.07

2,499

0.07

0.12

0.00

0.74

1,990

2,206,870

3,955,621

0.00

23,469,756

1,157
5,656.24
5,657.53
500
30,000
5,025 12,302,517,864 36,943,648,349
8,423,280
288,760,000,000
5,024 1,031,027,228 3,384,527,552
86,460
25,885,000,000
4,990
2.83
2.75
0.37
17.83
4,966 444,230,863
1,607,459,357 -1,675,859,250 11,635,000,000
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TABLE 8b: Descriptive statistics of unstandardized M & A data
Descriptive Statistics M & A Sample
Statistic
Dedicated
Transient
Relational Debt
Transactional
Debt
Unrelated
Diversification
Related
Diversification
R & D Intensity
MA/Assets
CEO options
Director options
Assets
Cash_NearCash
Free Cash Flow
Market-to-Book

N

Mean

St. Dev.

Min

Max

2,773
2,790
2,478

9.84
22.41
0.26

7.14
13.35
0.21

0.09
2.46
0.00

32.23
67.41
0.86

2,478

0.74

0.21

0.14

1.00

2,739

0.99

0.77

0.00

3.63

2,713

0.36

0.67

0.00

3.19

2,207
0.08
2,659
2.33
1,704
2,818,215
1,145
6,454.74
2,790 10,478,216,654
2,790
989,482,690
2,769
501,503,424
2,790
3.42

0.09
6.04
4,880,283
6,059.14
52,936,388,784
6,475,831,634
1,410,087,852
2.89
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0.00
0.52
0.00
173.78
0
30,551,340
500
31,140
34,472,000 1,120,650,000,000
0
225,037,000,000
-451,430,840 10,043,260,000
0.13
17.57

TABLE 8c: Descriptive statistics of unstandardized R & D data
Descriptive Statistics R & D Sample
Statistic
Dedicated
Transient
Relational
Transactional
R & D Intensity
CEO Stock
Options
Director
Options
Assets
Cash_NearCash
Market-ToBook
Free Cash Flow

N

Mean

St. Dev.

Min

Max

10,866
11,772
6,935
6,935
12,161

8.99
20.78
0.001
1.00
0.38

7.65
15.20
0.01
0.01
1.45

0.01
0.01
0.00
0.68
0.001

33.85
66.68
0.32
1.00
11.98

3,708

2,844,196

5,033,139

0.00

31,620,977

2,759

8,064.53

7,623.23

527.84

40,000

3,613,200
143,000

108,400,000,000
11,487,758,800

12,161 4,614,167,293 14,595,616,280
12,161 550,005,784 1,623,595,279
12,052

4.28

5.22

0.40

36.90

12,065

319,883,106

1,172,022,142

-317,113,440

8,720,000,000
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TABLE 9: List of Variables
Variable
Capital Structure
1. Relational debt

2. Transactional debt

3. Transient equity

4. Dedicated equity

Mediators
1. CEO Stock
Options

2. Outside Director
stock options

Diversification
Entropy measure

Innovation
1. Innovation

Definition

Source

Proportion of bank debt held by firm.
Denominator is sum of book value of equity
(BKLVPS X CSHO) and long-term debt
(DLTT)

Bank loan data available
from Osiris dataset.
Proportion calculated as
standard in literature
(Wang & Thornhill,
2010).
(Wang & Thornhill,
2010).

Debt not classified as relational.
Denominator is sum of book value of equity
(BKLVPS X CSHO) and long-term debt
(DLTT)
Proportion of shares outstanding
(Compustat variable CSHO) held by shortterm investors with highly diversified
portfolios
Proportion of shares outstanding held by
long-term investors with less diversified
portfolios.

Online public data
(Bushee, 2013) merged
with Thompson-Reuters
13f data. (Bushee,
2001).
Same as above.

Product of CEO stock option grants
awarded during firm’s fiscal year and the
Black-Scholes option value at that fiscal
year end. Variable directly available via
ExecuComp.
Outside director stock options. This variable
is average of stock option grants to outside
directors. Same calculation as CEO stock
options.

ExecuComp. (Lim &
McCann, 2013).

Unrelated diversification is the weighted
average of all firm industry group shares
Related diversification is the weighted
average of firm segment-to-group shares
across segments within all firm groups.

Compustat Business
Segments dataset.
(Davis & Duhaime,
1989; Palepu, 1985)

R & D intensity (XRD/ SALE)

Compustat Annual
Financials
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ExecuComp.

2. External
Innovation

Controls
1. Assets
2. Cash & Near Cash
3. Free Cash Flow
4. Firm Performance

Acquisitions. Measured as M & A
completed value/ Assets (Compustat
variable AT).

SDC Platinum M & A
dataset. (Puranam &
Srikanth, 2007)

Firm assets.(AT)

Compustat Annual
Financials.
Same as above.

Firm holdings of cash or near cash market
instruments
Operating Cash flow – capital expenditures
(OANCF – CAPX)
Market-to-Book (Market value of equity/
Book value of equity) calculated using
Compustat fiscal year closing stock price
(PRCC_F)
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Same as above.
Compustat Annual
Financials. (Patel &
Cooper, 2014)

TABLE 10a: Correlations for Diversification Sample
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1. Dedicated
2. Transient

0.15***

3. Relational Debt

0.06**

-0.03

4. Transactional
Debt

-0.06**

0.03

5. Unrelated
Diversification

0.05**

-0.09*** 0.05**

-0.05**

6. Related
Diversification

0.00

-0.07*** -0.02

0.02

0.10***

7. R & D Intensity

-0.06**

0.07***

-0.04

0.04

-0.10*** -0.06**

8. CEO Stock
Options

0.02

0.02

-0.08**

0.08** 0.01

0.09*** 0.23***

9. Director Options

0.02

0.15***

-0.05

0.05

-0.09** 0.42*** 0.24***

-1.0***

-0.08*

10. Assets

-0.07*** -0.13*** -0.05**

0.05** 0.12*** 0.24*** -0.06** 0.24*** 0.00

11. Cash_NearCash

-0.07*** -0.11*** -0.05**

0.05** 0.08*** 0.19*** 0.04*

12. Market-To-Book -0.03
13. Free Cash Flow

0.04**

0.03

-0.08*** -0.12*** -0.05*

-0.03

-0.04*

0.00

0.05*

0.14*** 0.19*** -0.02

0.22*** 0.08** 0.81***

0.19*** 0.24*** 0.10*** -0.03
0.22*** 0.03

0.02

0.60*** 0.63*** 0.09***

TABLE 10b: Correlations for M & A Sample
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1.

Dedicated

2.

Transient

0.05**

3.

Relational
Debt

0.09***

4.

Transactional
Debt

-0.09*** 0.01

5.

Unrelated
-0.07*** -0.16*** 0.01
Diversification

-0.01

6.

Related
-0.06**
Diversification

-0.22*** 0.01

-0.01

7.

R&D
Intensity

0.02

0.24*** -0.17*** 0.17*** -0.19*** -0.17***

8.

MA/Assets

-0.05*

0.16*** -0.08*** 0.08*** -0.13*** -0.11*** 0.14***

9.

CEO options

-0.05*

-0.02

10. Director
options

0.06

0.25*** -0.16*** 0.16*** -0.09**

11. Assets

-0.06*** -0.14*** -0.12*** 0.12*** 0.25***

12. Cash_NearCas
-0.06**
h

8

9

10

11

12

13

-0.01
-1.00***

0.62***

-0.10*** 0.10*** 0.03

0.06**

-0.09*** -0.11*** 0.11*** 0.13***

13. Free Cash
Flow

-0.10*** -0.21*** -0.21*** 0.21*** 0.24***

14. Market-toBook

0.00

-0.01

0.05*

-0.05*

-0.15*** 0.44*** 0.07*

0.25***

0.16*** -0.06** -0.07*** 0.12*** 0.06
0.11*** 0.06**

-0.05** 0.08*** 0.16*** 0.73***

0.20*** 0.01

-0.12*** 0.28*** 0.06

-0.11*** -0.04*
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0.28*** -0.10***

0.12*** 0.04

0.27*** 0.05

0.62*** 0.47***
0.03

0.02

0.15***

TABLE 10c: Correlations for R & D Sample

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1. Dedicated
2. Transient

0.11***

3. Relational

0.00

-0.03**

4. Transactional

0.00

0.03**

5. Unrelated Diversification

-0.01

-0.11*** 0.01

-0.01

6. Related Diversification

0.01

-0.10*** -0.01

0.01

0.40***

7. R & D Intensity

0.02

0.00

-0.01

0.01

-0.07*** -0.07***

8. CEO Stock Options

0.00

-0.01

-0.05*

0.05* 0.00

9. Director Options

-0.02

0.15*** -0.04

0.04

-0.15*** -0.13*** 0.15***

10. Assets

-0.10***

-0.19*** -0.02

0.02

0.40***

0.38***

-0.07*** 0.23*** -0.05*

11. Cash_NearCash

-0.10***

-0.16*** -0.02

0.02

0.27***

0.24***

-0.05*** 0.29*** 0.12*** 0.82***

12. Market-To-Book

-0.01

0.05*** 0.01

-0.01 -0.06*** -0.05*** 0.11***

13. Free Cash Flow

-0.10***

-0.17*** -0.02

0.02

-1.00***
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0.28***

0.06**

0.30***

0.02
0.25***

0.24*** 0.09*** -0.03*** 0.00

-0.06*** 0.22*** 0.01

0.85***

0.82*** 0.02*

TABLE 11: GMM Results for Unrelated Diversification
GMM Results for Unrelated Diversification (Diversification sample)
CEO
Unrelated Diversification
options
Model
Model 1
Model 3 Model 4
2
Assets
0.29**
0.09
0.40*** 0.18**
(0.11)
(0.13)
(0.11)
(0.06)
Market-To-Book
-0.05
-0.08
-0.08
0.41*
(0.10)
(0.10)
(0.13)
(0.17)
Cash_NearCash
-0.10
0.00
0.35***
0.47***
(0.10)
(0.13)
(0.12)
(0.07)
Free Cash Flow
0.31*** 0.14
0.18°
0.12
(0.08)
(0.11)
(0.10)
(0.08)
Transactional Debt
-0.11
0.01
0.08
(0.09)
(0.12)
(0.31)
Transactional Debt t-1
-0.04
-0.20
-0.03
(0.33)
(0.35)
(0.19)
Transient
-0.05
-0.20°
-0.27°
(0.09)
(0.11)
(0.16)
Transient t-1
-0.03
-0.04
0.25°
(0.08)
(0.11)
(0.14)
Dedicated
0.00
0.02
(0.08)
(0.10)
Dedicated t-1
0.12
0.10
(0.09)
(0.10)
CEO options
-0.03
-0.04
(0.10)
(0.09)
CEO options t-1
0.05
0.10
(0.05)
(0.06)
Num. obs. used
2047
1621
1182
1301
2
Sargan Test: Χ
285.81
176.53 149.83
145.69
Wald Test Coefficients: Χ2
35.23*** 3.83
40.04*** 59.84***
Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test
2.31*
1.57
-0.05
-2.05*
(1)
Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test
-0.62
-1.24
-0.38
1.00
(2)
***
p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, °p < 0.1
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TABLE 12: GMM Results for Related Diversification
GMM Results for Related Diversification (Diversification sample)
Director
Related Diversification
Options
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Model 4
Assets
0.33
0.17
0.13
-0.11
(0.20)
(0.16)
(0.20)
(0.07)
Market-To-Book
-0.14*
0.07
-0.00
0.08
(0.07)
(0.09)
(0.10)
(0.12)
Cash_NearCash
-0.13
-0.09
-0.16
0.18*
(0.17)
(0.17)
(0.21)
(0.08)
Free Cash Flow
0.11
0.21°
0.19
0.11
(0.09)
(0.11)
(0.13)
(0.08)
Relational
-0.02
-0.10
-0.07
(0.12)
(0.19)
(0.15)
Relational t-1
-0.29*
-1.00°
-0.23°
(0.12)
(0.57)
(0.13)
Dedicated
-0.03
0.28**
-0.13
(0.06)
(0.10)
(0.15)
Dedicated t-1
0.12°
-0.14
0.02
(0.06)
(0.10)
(0.10)
Transient
-0.12
-0.09
(0.08)
(0.10)
Transient t-1
-0.08
-0.35**
(0.05)
(0.12)
Director options
0.13
0.02
(0.19)
(0.11)
Director options t-1
-0.49*
-0.35*
(0.22)
(0.17)
Num. obs. used
2597
1077
673
754
2
Sargan Test: Χ
338.39
130.08
106.01
119.53
2
***
***
**
Wald Test Coefficients: Χ
31.98
18.96
26.92
15.91**
Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test
1.39
-0.7
-0.1
-0.84
(1)
Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test
-0.44
-0.92
-0.17
-1.05
(2)
***
p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, °p < 0.1

161

TABLE 13: GMM Results for Mergers & Acquisitions
GMM Results for Mergers & Acquisitions ( M & A Sample)
CEO
M&A
options
Model
Model
Model
Model 4
1
2
3
Assets
0.03
0.04
0.01
0.06
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.06)
Market-to-Book
-0.02
-0.06°
-0.04
0.30***
(0.04)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.08)
Cash_NearCash
-0.03
-0.29** -0.10
0.57
(0.03)
(0.10)
(0.08)
(0.68)
Free Cash Flow
-0.11** -0.01
-0.03
-0.18
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.24)
Transactional Debt
0.13*
0.07
0.15°
(0.06)
(0.06)
(0.09)
Transactional Debt t-1
-0.06
0.03
-0.01
(0.06)
(0.05)
(0.07)
Transient
0.12*
0.19** -0.27*
(0.05)
(0.07)
(0.11)
Transient t-1
-0.03
-0.04
-0.04
(0.04)
(0.05)
(0.09)
Dedicated
-0.11*
-0.06°
(0.06)
(0.03)
Dedicated t-1
0.12
0.04
(0.08)
(0.05)
CEO options
-0.04*
-0.06**
(0.02)
(0.02)
CEO options t-1
-0.05*
-0.06**
(0.02)
(0.02)
Num. obs. used
1837
1080
980
2
Sargan Test: Χ
211.18 152.32 148.35
Wald Test Coefficients: Χ2
54.96*** 33.30*** 81.66***
Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test
-2.66** -2.48*
-2.34*
(1)
Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test
-0.36
-0.01
-0.01
(2)
***
p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, °p < 0.1
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1169
160.43
312.85***
-2.1*
-1.25

TABLE 14: GMM Results for Research & Development
GMM Results for R & D (R & D Sample)
Director
options
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
-0.05*
-0.09** -0.02
-0.55***
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.15)
0.03
-0.05°
-0.01
-0.04
(0.05)
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.08)
0.03
-0.00
-0.04
0.42*
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.17)
-0.05
0.01
-0.01
0.09
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.11)
-0.02
0.21
-0.64°
(0.02)
(0.25)
(0.35)
-0.02***
0.22
-1.14
(0.01)
(0.25)
(0.85)
0.05
0.13
-0.18°
(0.06)
(0.10)
(0.10)
-0.01
-0.04
0.03
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.07)
0.12
-0.01
(0.09)
(0.03)
-0.03
-0.02
(0.06)
(0.03)
-0.02
0.07
(0.02)
(0.06)
-0.04
-0.02
(0.03)
(0.04)
6869
3544
2034
2213
452.68
263.54 235.16 203.48
***
48.93
42.43*** 28.46** 15.21*
R&D

Assets
Market-To-Book
Cash_NearCash
Free Cash Flow
Relational
Relational t-1
Dedicated
Dedicated t-1
Transient
Transient t-1
Director options
Director options t-1

Num. obs. used
Sargan Test: Χ2
Wald Test Coefficients: Χ2
Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test
-2.66*
(1)
Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test (2) -0.88
***
p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, °p < 0.1
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-0.19

-0.90

-2.02*

-0.99

-1.66

-0.74

TABLE 15: Summary of Significant Results
Hypothesis

Independent Variable

Result

Unrelated Diversification (Table 11)
H1b (Model 3)

Transient Equity

Sign opposite of hypothesis, negative
association. Significant at 0.1 level.

Related Diversification (Table 12)
H1c (Model 3)
H 2a (Model 1
& 3)
H 2b (Model 3)

Transient Equity
Relational debt

H 9 (Model 2 &
3)

Director options

As hypothesized, negative association.
Sign opposite of hypothesis, negative
association with Related diversification.
As hypothesized, positive association.

Dedicated Equity

Sign opposite of hypothesis. Director options
are negatively associated with related
diversification.
M & A (Table 13)

H 4 b (Model 1
& 3)
H 5 c (Model 1
& 3)
H 4 a (Model 1)

Transient Equity

As hypothesized, positive association.

Dedicated Equity

As hypothesized, negative association.

Transactional Debt

As hypothesized, positive association.

H7&8
Mediation
(Model 3 & 4)

Transactional Debt,
Transient Equity &
CEO options

Transient equity positively associated with M &
A (model 3) and negatively associated with
CEO options (model 4). CEO options
negatively associated with M & A supporting
H8.

R & D (Table 14)
H 5 a (Model 1)

Relational debt

Sign opposite of hypothesis, negative
association.

164

TABLE 16: Post-hoc Analysis of Firm Diversification, R & D and Performance

Model 1

Market-to-Book
Model 2 Model 3

Model 5

ROA
Model 6

Model 4

Model 7

Model 8

Assets

-0.14**

-0.06

-0.09°

-0.22***

-0.22***

-0.15***

-0.22***

-0.17***

Cash_NearCash

(0.05)
0.08
(0.05)

(0.06)
0.05
(0.06)

(0.05)
0.05
(0.05)

(0.04)
0.14**
(0.05)

(0.04)
0.12**
(0.04)

(0.03)
0.06*
(0.03)

(0.03)
0.12**
(0.04)

(0.04)
0.01
(0.04)

Free Cash Flow

0.10*

0.08*

0.07*

0.05°

0.19***

0.17***

0.20***

0.25***

(0.04)

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.05)

(0.04)

(0.05)

(0.05)

Unrelated Diversification

0.11

0.11

Unrelated Diversification t-1

(0.17)
-0.25
(0.18)

(0.09)
-0.12
(0.11)

Related Diversification
Related Diversification t-1
Diversification Total
Diversification Total t-1
Diversification Total2

-0.00

-0.06

(0.09)

(0.07)

-0.05

0.06

(0.10)

(0.07)
-0.20
(0.13)
-0.06
(0.08)

0.15
(0.11)
-0.05
(0.06)

0.07*

-0.02

(0.03)

(0.03)

R and D Intensity

-0.04

-0.09

R and D Intensity

(0.06)
0.06
(0.05)

(0.20)
-0.51***
(0.07)

Num. obs. used
Sargan Test: Χ

2

Wald Test Coefficients: Χ2
Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test (1)
Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test (2)

3906

4937

3834

284.37

303.49

12.75*
-2.80**
0.59

8.05
-3.00**
0.19

*
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14633
**

321.73

585.09

15.88*
-2.49*
0.39

33.18**
-3.44**
-3.08**

2979

3914

2926

10256

246.85

242.07

264.43

355.15**

41.96***
-3.54**
-2.18*

35.53***
-4.12***
-2.34**

49.76***
-3.41**
-2.11*

225.34***
-6.97***
-3.20**

APPENDIX
R CODE FOR DATA REPLICATION

(# Precede comments, rest is R code)
#Adding e1996 files (Bushee + 13f)
e2010<-read.csv("e2010.csv", header = TRUE)
#Data check using GE as example, all OK
GE2010<-subset(e2010,e2010$ticker=="GE")
#Getting last known holdings for each ticker by mgrno (Manager Number in
Bushee and 13f filings) to avoid double counting of shareholdings
e1996$date<-as.Date(as.character(e1996$rdate),"%Y%m%d")
e1996$sharesoutstanding<-(e1996$shrout1*1000000)
library(dplyr)
laste1996<-e1996 %>% group_by(ticker,mgrno)
%>%filter(date==max(date))
#Separate Calculation of proportion of shares held by Transient,
Dedicated and Quasi-indexer using R package dplyr
library(dplyr)
laste1996q <-laste1996 %>% group_by(ticker) %>%
filter(permclass=="QIX")%>%
mutate(QIXshares=sum(shares))
laste1996t <-laste1996 %>% group_by(ticker) %>%
filter(permclass=="TRA")%>%
mutate(TRAshares=sum(shares))
laste1996d <-laste1996 %>% group_by(ticker) %>%
filter(permclass=="DED")%>%
mutate(DEDshares=sum(shares))
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e1996temp<-merge(laste1996q, laste1996t, by=c("ticker"), all=TRUE)
e1996holdings <-merge(e1996temp, laste1996d, by=c("ticker"), all=TRUE)
e1996holdings<-unique(e1996full [ , 1:3])
#Combined Bushee classification data with Thompson-Reuters 13F filings and then with
WRDS Compustat fiscal year data, firm-years =35,705 Original in file, add
ewrdsfullYEAR files and holdingYEAR files to merge
ewrdsfull1996<-read.csv("ewrdsfull1996.csv", header = TRUE)
holdings1996<-read.csv("eholdings1996.csv", header = TRUE)
eh1996<-merge(ewrdsfull1996, holdings1996, by=c("tic"), all.x=TRUE)
#Diversification calculation, calculate DU, DR & DT, remove duplicates
d1996<-read.csv("d1996.csv", header = TRUE)
library(pylr)
d1996 <-ddply(d1996, .(gvkey), transform, totalsales = sum(sales))
d1996 <-ddply(d1996, .(gvkey,SICS1), transform, segmentsales = sum(sales))
d1996 <-ddply(d1996, .(gvkey,SICS1_2), transform, groupsales = sum(sales))
dr1996 <-ddply(d1996, .(gvkey),
summarize,
DR = sum((segmentsales/groupsales)*log(groupsales/segmentsales)))
du1996<-ddply(d1996, .(gvkey),
summarize,
DU = sum((groupsales/totalsales)*log(totalsales/groupsales)))
D1996<-merge(du1996, dr1996, by='gvkey',all=T)
D1996$DT<-D1996$DR + D1996$DU
head(D1996,25) #data check
#adding Diversification file D1996 to eh1996 without loss of primary data and
removing duplicate observations
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ehd1996<-merge(eh1996, D1996, by=c("gvkey"), all.x=TRUE)
ehd1996<-ehd1996[!duplicated(ehd1996$gvkey),]
#Stacking yearly files (ehdYEAR) to create panel
ehd1997_2010<-rbind(ehd1997,ehd1998,ehd1999,ehd2000,ehd2001,ehd2002,
ehd2003,ehd2004,ehd2005,ehd2006,ehd2007,ehd2008, ehd2009,ehd2010)
cols<-intersect(colnames(ehd1997_2010), colnames(ehd1996))
ehd1996_2010<-rbind(ehd1997_2010[,cols], ehd1996[,cols])
#Adding relational debt from Osiris, using CIK numbers to get GVKEYS from WRDS,
then merging with main data.
bankloanO1<-read.csv("bankloanO1.csv", header=TRUE)
Changing Osiris data from factor to numeric before calculating full variable and
downloading gvkeys from WRDS
bankloanO1$BankLoanOsiris<-as.numeric(as.character(bankloanO1$DATA21070))
bankloanO1$AllLoansOsiris<-as.numeric(as.character(bankloanO1$DATA21010))
osiristic<-read.csv("osiristic.csv",header=TRUE)
osiriscik<-read.csv("osiriscik.csv", header=TRUE)
bankloan03<-merge(bankloan02, osiristic, by=c("tic","fyear"), all.x=TRUE)
bankloan04<-merge(bankloan03, osiriscik, by=c("CIK","fyear"), all.x=TRUE)
bankloan04$fyear.x<-as.Date(as.character(bankloan04$fyear), "%Y")
bankloan05<-subset(bankloan04, fyear.x > "1995-12-31")
bankloan06<-subset(bankloan05, fyear.x < "2010-12-31")
#Most common identifier available is still ticker, so used for merging after renaming
columns.
ehdb<-merge(ehd1996_2010, bankloan06,
by.x=c("tic","fyear.x"),by.y=c("tic.x","fyear"), all.x=TRUE)
#Removing duplicate observations created by full merge
ehdb2<-ehdb[!duplicated(ehdb[c("tic","fyear.x")]),]
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#cleaned ehdb (EquityHolderDiversificationBankloan) file version #3 used for further
combinations.
#Combining with ExecuComp data : ceoanncomp, CoDirectorFull using GVKEY (no
missing values in ExecuComp data) and YEAR
ceoanncomp<-read.csv("ceoanncomp.csv", header=TRUE)
CoDirectorFull<-read.csv("CoDirectorFull.csv", header=TRUE)
ehdbceo<-merge(ehdb3, ceoanncomp, by=c("GVKEY","YEAR"), all.x=TRUE)
ehdbceodir<-merge(ehdbceo, CoDirectorFull, by=c("GVKEY","YEAR"), all.x=TRUE)
#ehdbceodir has dimensions 34,546 by 259; but most firm years have missing data due
to full merge used. Check data again using GE as example
GEfull<-subset(ehdbceodir,tic=="GE") #all OK
#subsetting ehdbceodir to get variables for setting up final panel.
panelsetup<-subset(ehdbceodir, select=c(GVKEY, YEAR, tic, DEDholdings,
TRAholdings, csho, BankLoanOsiris, at,che, dltt, bkvlps, DU, DR, DT, revt,sale, prcc_f,
re, wcap, xrd, xsga, dlc, ebit, emp, intan, ni, capx, oancf,
OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE, OPTION_AWARDS_RPT_VALUE, TDC1,
ANNDIRRET, NUMMTGS, DIRSTK, DIROPT, SALECHG, NICHG, EPSEXCHG,
ROEAVG, ROA,MKTVAL, SHRSOUT,sich,naicsh))
panelsetup$Sharesoutstanding<-panelsetup$csho*1000000
panelsetup$Sharesoutstanding2<-panelsetup$SHRSOUT*1000000
#Institution holdings converted to percentage ownership.
panelsetup$Dedicated<-(panelsetup$DEDshares/panelsetup$Sharesoutstanding)*100
panelsetup$Transient<-(panelsetup$TRAshares /panelsetup$Sharesoutstanding)*100
panelsetup$LongTermDebt<-panelsetup$dltt*1000000
panelsetup$BookValueofEquity<-panelsetup$Sharesoutstanding*panelsetup$bkvlps
panelsetup$Relational<-panelsetup$BankLoanOsiris/(panelsetup$LongTermDebt+
panelsetup$BookValueofEquity)
panelsetup$Transactional<-(1-panelsetup$Relational)
panelsetup$CEOStockOptionsBS<panelsetup$OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE*1000
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panelsetup$Assets<-panelsetup$at*1000000
panelsetup$Cash_NearCash<-panelsetup$che*1000000
panelsetup$MarketToBook<(panelsetup$prcc_f*panelsetup$Sharesoutstanding)/panelsetup$BookValueofEquity
panelsetup$OperatingCashFlow<-panelsetup$oancf*1000000
panelsetup$CapitalExpenditures<-panelsetup$capx*1000000
panelsetup$FreeCashFlow<-(panelsetup$OperatingCashFlow panelsetup$CapitalExpenditures)
panelsetup$RandDIntensity<-(panelsetup$xrd/panelsetup$sale)

For any queries, please contact me: chetanchawla@gmail.com
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